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ABSTRACT 
The charter of a corporation is the “constitution” agreed to by all 
its members.  The charter, however, is not a “suicide pact,”  it can be 
amended according to the charter amendment rules in corporate law 
when circumstances change.  These charter amendment rules vary 
significantly across jurisdictions.  In Delaware, shareholders can 
amend the charter with a simple majority vote of shares.  The 
amendment must be initiated by the board of directors and decisions 
to amend the charter are made usually by a supermajority vote of 
shares.  Board approval is not necessary in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, or France.  Within a given jurisdiction, the rules 
governing the amendment of different provisions are also very 
different.  This Article makes the first attempt to employ the 
constitutional economic theory developed by Buchanan and Tullock 
to explain different charter amendment rules.  It identifies a 
fundamental tradeoff between the needs of adaptation and 
commitment.  If charter amendment rules are too procedurally 
burdensome, they may harm the adaptation of corporate charters.  If 
they do not impose meaningful regulation on charter amendment, 
minority shareholders cannot be sure that corporate insiders or 
controlling shareholders would not amend the charter in the 
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midstream to harm shareholders’ interests.  Different states may 
choose different charter amendment rules to achieve a balance 
between adaptation and commitment.  The choice between different 
charter amendment rules made by different states can be explained 
by several factors, including institutional investors and judicial 
capacity.  This theory sheds new light on a series of issues in the 
corporate law literature, including the explanation for mandatory 
rules and appraisal rights in corporate law, the debate of increasing 
shareholder power in the United States, and why law, rather than 
contract, is important in corporate governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The charter of a corporation is the “constitution” of the 
corporation that sets out the “rules of the game.”  The charter, 
however, is not a “suicide pact,” it is subject to amendment pursuant 
to the charter amendment rules when circumstances change.1  A 
comparative study of the charter amendment rules in several major 
jurisdictions—the state of Delaware in the United States, the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), France, and Germany—shows that different 
jurisdictions have adopted very different charter amendment rules.  
For example, while the corporate law in Delaware mandates that 
only the board has the power to initiate an amendment to the 
corporate charter and a simple majority vote of shares is necessary 
to pass an amendment to corporate charters, a decision to amend the 
charter in the U.K. does not need board approval but must be 
approved by a three-fourths majority vote of shares.2  Within a given 
jurisdiction, the amendment rules for different provisions in the 
corporate charter are also different—some provisions are subject to 
amendment by a majority or a supermajority vote of shares while 
others are mandatory rules that cannot be amended. 
This Article endeavors to develop a theoretical framework to 
analyze the social costs associated with different charter amendment 
rules and to explain the variation of these rules both across and 
within jurisdictions.  It argues that two goals that are usually in 
conflict need to be considered in choosing the rules that govern the 
amendment of a corporate charter: adaptability and commitment.3  A 
corporation may exist for a long time.  When circumstances change, 
the corporate charter also needs to adapt.  While all shareholders 
 
 1 Different states use different terms to refer to the charters, including, for 
example, “certificate of incorporation” in the state of Delaware and “articles of 
associations” in the United Kingdom.  See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA]; Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 17 (Eng.) 
[https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J.  See also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2019) 
[https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA] (describing the requirements for adopting, 
amending, and appealing bylaws).  The Delaware Corporate Code uses the term 
“charter” in a broad sense.  It includes the bylaws that contain provisions that are 
relatively unimportant. 
 2 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2019), [https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA]; 
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 283 (Eng.), [https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J]. 
 3 See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 9 
(2006) (discussing the costs and benefits of a charter that is difficult to amend versus 
a charter that is easy to amend). 
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agree to the corporate charter when they join the corporation, 
unanimous consent is usually not required when the charter is to be 
amended.4  Requiring unanimous consent would negatively affect 
the charter’s adaptability.5  On the other hand, if the charter can be 
amended too easily, the unanimous consent given by the 
shareholders at the time when the charter was enacted becomes 
meaningless because a corporate insider can always change the 
“rules of the game” afterwards.  If the corporate charter can be 
amended simply by a majority vote of shares without any further 
legal constraints, including fiduciary duty or mandatory rules in 
corporate law, corporate insiders or the shareholders controlling a 
majority of shares may amend the charters opportunistically.  
Expecting this problem ex ante, investors may then refrain from 
buying the shares in the corporations even if the corporate charters 
offer them strong protection of their rights at the time of their 
investment.  This commitment problem would deter investment or at 
least raise the cost of outside capital when a corporation is 
established. 
In economic terms, different charter amendment rules give rise 
to different levels of decision-making costs and external costs.  
Decision-making costs include the costs that shareholders incur in 
participating in collective decisions and the costs that arise because 
of the problem of holdout.6  Shareholders participating in collective 
decisions need to spend time and resources in evaluating the 
decision, which impose a direct cost on them while the benefits are 
 
 4 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2019), [https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA]; 
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 283 (Eng.), [https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J]. 
 5 At a publicly held company, unanimity requires not just the consent of all 
shareholders, but all potential shareholders in the world, who could buy a single 
share to block the transaction.  Shareholders may agree to a rule of supermajority 
vote, which requires a three fourths majority vote of share.  Under this 
arrangement, shareholders holding more than a quarter of shares can block the 
amendment to the corporate charter.  These shareholders may hold out the 
amendment to obtain more benefits. William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate 
Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 
79-82. 
 6 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 98-
99 (1962).  Decision-making costs arise here because normally a bargaining range 
will exist, and, recognizing this, each individual will seek to secure the maximum 
gains possible for himself while keeping the net gains to his partners in the 
agreement to the minimum.  Each individual will be led to try to conceal his own 
true preferences from the others in order to secure a greater share of the ‘surplus’ 
expected to be created from the choice being carried out. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
434 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:2 
 
to be shared by all shareholders.  Thus, they may lack incentive to 
participate and choose to free-ride on the efforts of others.  For those 
who participate, each shareholder has incentive to hold out the 
decision until he gains more from the bargain even though the 
amendment is in the interest of the corporation.7  A high procedural 
threshold for amending a charter provision incurs relatively high 
decision-making costs, which affect the adaptability of a corporate 
charter because shareholders may be unable to approve an 
amendment that is beneficial to all shareholders.  Meanwhile, 
external costs are the social costs that arise because corporate 
insiders or controlling shareholders may make an amendment that 
benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders as a group.8  It 
results from the so-called “opportunistic amendment problem”—
insiders of a corporation may amend the corporate charter to 
enhance their power or even entrench themselves after shareholders 
join the corporation, harming the interests of shareholders.9  A low 
threshold for charter amendment gives rise to relatively high 
external costs, which may deter investment ex ante because of the 
insiders’ inability to make a commitment to investors that they would 
not amend the charter in a way that harms shareholders. 
Different charter amendment rules incur different degrees of 
external and decision-making costs.  As the size of the vote required 
to approve an amendment increases and the procedural constraints 
on the amendment are tightened, decision-making costs rise while 
external costs decline. 10   This theory suggests that different 
provisions in a corporate charter should be subject to different 
amendment rules.11  When the amendment involves provisions that 
are relatively trivial, shareholders may make an amendment 
decision by a simple majority vote or simply delegate the decision 
 
 7 See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 751 (1997) (“In the case of a holdout, however, the securities 
holder who withholds her vote does so in order to reap an additional profit as a 
result of her support at a later, more critical stage.”). 
 8 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 45-46. 
 9 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1549, 1573-75 (1989) (discussing the benefits of eliminating opportunistic 
amendment through mandatory rules). 
 10 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 74 (making a similar argument 
in considering the economics of constitution).  See also infra Section 1.2. (discussing 
these issues in greater detail). 
 11 Id. at 73 (“All potential governmental or collective activity should not be 
organized through the operation of the same decision-making rule.”). 
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to the board of directors.  For more important provisions, 
shareholders may set a supermajority rule, for example, a three 
fourths majority rule, for amending these provisions.  When it comes 
to the amendment of provisions that fundamentally alter 
shareholders’ rights, shareholders should choose a unanimity rule, 
in which case shareholders cannot amend these provisions without 
unanimous consent of all shareholders, or a mandatory rule, which 
prevents the charter provision from being amended.  
The theoretical framework of external and decision-making 
costs explains why different states have adopted different charter 
amendment rules.12  Corporate laws in different jurisdictions need 
to achieve a different balance between external costs and decision-
making costs.  In jurisdictions where external costs are the major 
concern, corporate laws are likely to set up a high threshold for 
charter amendment. 13   Where external costs can be effectively 
controlled by other mechanisms and decision-making costs are the 
major concern, corporate laws may adopt a relatively low threshold 
for charter amendment.14  This Article identifies two major factors 
that may affect the magnitudes of external costs and decision-
making costs in a given state: institutional investors and judicial 
capacity.  Given the different roles played by institutional investors 
and the different capacity of courts in different states, the same 
charter amendment rule may incur different levels of external and 
decision-making costs, rendering the same rule efficient in some 
states but not in others. 
For example, the three fourths majority rule in the U.K. can be 
explained by the fact that decision-making costs for shareholder 
voting are relatively lower than other major jurisdictions because 
institutional investors play an active role in corporate governance in 
the U.K. and the free-rider problem is less severe. 15   A second 
 
 12  While scholars have long noticed this difference, current theories have 
failed to provide an adequate explanation.  For example, the widely accepted 
distinction between civil law and common law does not explain the drastic 
difference between the law in U.K. and the state of Delaware.  Rock et al. mentioned 
the differences but did not offer any explanation.  Edward Rock et al., Fundamental 
Changes, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, 186-87, 222-24 (2009) (explaining 
possible alternative structural explanations for the difference between U.K. and 
Delaware corporation laws).  
 13 See infra Section 2.1. 
 14 See infra Section 2.1. 
 15 See infra Section 2.1. 
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example might be the state of Delaware.  The simple majority rule 
adopted in the state of Delaware can be explained by the fact that 
courts in Delaware are highly capable of detecting opportunistic 
actions and play a major role in protecting shareholders from 
opportunistic amendment decisions initiated by corporate 
insiders. 16   Thus, external costs are relatively unimportant for 
corporations in Delaware.  The bilateral veto regime in Delaware 
could be viewed as an effort to reduce decision-making costs 
compared to the supermajority rule by lowering the threshold for 
shareholder approval and delegating the power to the board of 
directors. 
The theoretical framework of external and decision-making 
costs also provides a new explanation for mandatory rules in 
corporate law, which has long been a subject of academic interest.17  
Currently, the most influential theory about mandatory rules in 
corporate law is the “opportunistic amendment hypothesis” 
proposed by Jeffrey Gordon.18   Corporate insiders or controlling 
shareholders may amend the charter in the midstream to enhance 
 
 16 See infra Section 2.1. 
 17 See infra Section 2.2. 
 18  Gordon, supra note 9 at 1573 (arguing that mandatory law provides 
insurance against opportunistic amendments that take advantage of incomplete 
corporate contracts).  This “opportunistic amendment” problem has been 
recognized as a major justification for mandatory rules in corporate law.  Roberta 
Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: the Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate 
Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV.  1599, 1606 (1989) (questioning the validity of the 
“opportunistic amendment” problem as an explanation for the mechanics of 
corporate law); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 566 (1990) (analyzing that charter amendments may 
increase shareholder wealth without maximizing it because managers seek their 
own benefits from such amendments); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate 
on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1401 (1989) 
(suggesting possible alternative procedures to implement charter amendments).  
See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.  
1461, 1461(1989) (arguing that there are certain constitutive rules, including 
distributional rules, structural rules, and fiduciary rules, that should be made 
mandatory).  The problems of shareholder voting in amending corporate charters 
also led many corporations to adopt the default rules offered by states.  See generally 
Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2006); Yair 
Listokin, What do Corporate Default Rules and Menus do? An Empirical Examination, 6 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 279-308 (2009) (examining empirical evidence of the 
impact of corporate anti-takeover enabling statutes).  
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their power at the expense of outside shareholders.19  This theory, 
however, cannot explain why corporations are allowed to adopt 
takeover defenses which may harm the interests of shareholders and 
benefit corporate insiders.20  The theory in this Article suggests that 
the opportunistic amendment hypothesis is incomplete because it 
focuses entirely on external costs and ignores the associated 
decision-making costs.21  Although mandatory rules eliminate the 
danger of opportunistic amendment, they harm the adaptability of 
corporate charters and thus incur decision-making costs. 22   Still, 
mandatory rules are not always in the best interests of outside 
shareholders faced with an opportunistic amendment problem.23  
This theory can better explain why mandatory rules vary across 
jurisdictions, and over time, the factors that affect the external costs 
and decision-making costs change. 
This theory also explains the procedural requirements imposed 
on the exercise of appraisal rights and why the appraisal remedy has 
played a more important role in the United States.24  Scholars have 
noticed that in many jurisdictions, corporate law imposes strict 
procedures on the exercise of appraisal rights, which is usually 
costly for the dissenting shareholders.25  In addition, the valuation 
 
 19 Shareholders generally do not have fiduciary duty towards the corporation 
and can maximize their own welfare.  See J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of 
Controlling Shareholder’s Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV., 9, 12 
(1987) (“Finally, the initial burden of fiduciary obligations rests on corporate 
officials…Shareholders, on the other hand, have traditionally been said to owe no 
fiduciary obligations to each other”). 
 20 Romano, supra note 18, at 1606 (“ [T]here are no mandatory laws preventing 
such activity[the adoption of takeover defenses].”). 
 21 See infra Section 2.2. 
 22 See infra Section 2.2. 
 23 See infra Section 2.2. 
 24  For examples of current studies, see Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s 
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 237-38 (1962) (explaining 
the mechanisms used to exercise appraisal remedies); Paul G. Mahoney & Mark 
Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV., 239, 
243-45 (1999) (describing the theories surrounding the role of appraisal); Robert B. 
Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 
GEO. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1995) (tracing the historical flux of appraisal in business).  
 25 See Manning supra note 24, (describing the respective bargaining position 
of dissenting shareholders); see also Elliott J. Weiss; Lawrence J. White, Of 
Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors’ Reactions to Changes in Corporate 
Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 551, 596 (1987) (“The procedural complexity and the cost of 
seeking appraisal, combined with the courts’ use of valuation methods that 
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of the fair value of stocks is often uncertain and unpredictable, 
determined on a case-by-case basis by courts with careful 
consideration of the wrongdoings of the majority shareholders.26  
This Article suggests that the goal of the appraisal remedy is not 
simply to protect the interests of the minority but also to achieve a 
balance between external and decision-making costs. 27   If the 
exercise of appraisal remedy becomes costless for dissenting 
shareholders, many dissenting shareholders may employ this 
remedy to hold out corporate changes that benefit shareholders as a 
whole to extract private benefits.  This Article suggests that these 
 
provided most dissenting shareholders with scant hope of obtaining satisfactory 
relief, made appraisal a ‘remedy of desperation.’”).  For earlier discussion, see 
Comment, The Doctrine of Strict Priority in Corporate Recapitalization, 54 YALE L.J. 840, 
845 (1945) (listing the weaknesses associated with appraisal rights); Note, Appraisal 
of Corporate Dissenters’ Shares: Apportioning the Proceeding’s Financial Burdens, 60 
YALE L.J. 337, 340-343 (1951) (specifying the financial burdens associated with 
appraisal proceedings that frustrate their compensatory purpose); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments, HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1854 (1989) (explaining the effect of 
appraisals on manager decision-making); Note, Interplay of Rights of Stockholders 
Dissenting from Sale of Corporate Assets, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 251, 254 (1958):  
Appraisal supposedly protects the stockholder from any monetary loss 
which he would sustain by submission to the dictates of the majority. 
There is, however, criticism of its efficacy, based on the realization that the 
appraised value of the stock is not always its real or full worth. Since it is 
probably impossible to derive any method which would always be 
accurate in arriving at a value fair to all, the availability of relief other than 
appraisal is often of utmost importance. 
 26 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts 
Determine Fair Value, DUKE L.J. 680, fn. 339 (showing that courts often reach 
appraisal values far greater than those offered by corporations); Cavalier Oil Corp. 
v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (upholding a higher appraisal value than 
proposed by the corporation); In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 
1991) (awarding a larger appraisal value to the plaintiff after court evaluation of 
appraisal methods); Neal v. Alabama By-Products Corp., No. CIV.A.8282, 1990 WL 
109243, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (assigning a higher value for shareholders than 
initially offered by the corporation).  In other jurisdictions, the application of 
appraisal rights also depends on a case-by-case basis.  See Alan K. Koh, Appraising 
Japan’s Appraisal Remedy, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 417, 434 (2014) (outlining alternative 
methods for appraisal used in corporations in Japan); Hideki Kanda, Saul Levmore, 
The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 433 (1985) 
(“it is designed to accomplish the ‘discovery goal,’ explained in Part I as essentially 
a goal allowing shareholders to use the appraisal remedy to uncover possible 
managerial misbehavior.”). 
 27 James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder’s Appraisal Right, 
77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1216-17 (1964) (stating that, appraisal rights need to balance 
“the relative dangers of oppression by the majority and harassment by the 
minority.”). 
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procedural burdens and uncertainty might be necessary in 
balancing these two costs and that proposals to alleviate the burdens 
on dissenting shareholders in exercising their appraisal rights may 
not always be socially desirable.28 
The above theory also has important implications on the debate 
of increasing shareholder power in the United States.  Currently, 
some scholars argue that the bilateral veto regime generates a bias 
towards the status quo that benefits managers of the corporation at 
the expense of shareholders’ interests.29  Others disagree and point 
out that delegating power to the board of directors benefits 
shareholders. 30   This Article provides a new perspective to this 
debate.  The bilateral veto regime offers additional protection to 
shareholders by setting up an additional barrier of approval by the 
board of directors.31  If, for example, the state of Delaware shifts to a 
unitary veto regime and allows shareholders to initiate charter 
amendment with a simple majority vote of share, decision-making 
costs would be reduced because shareholders can now make 
amendments with fewer procedural constraints but external costs 
may rise.  Shareholders individually or collectively holding a 
majority of shares may adopt provisions in the corporate charter that 
benefit them at the expense of other shareholders.32  Thus, the power 
 
 28  Many scholars believe that the procedural costs imposed on dissenting 
shareholders in the exercise of appraisal rights should be alleviated.  See, e.g., 
Wertheimer, supra note 26 at 708; Robert B. Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and the 
New Appraisal Remedy, 62 WASH. U. L. Q. 415, 432 (1984) (“The Delaware court has 
carved out an ambitious goal for the appraisal process; but appraisal may not be 
able to protect the minority without legislative changes.”); Joel Seligman, 
Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 831 (1984) (“This 
Article begins by analyzing the basic defects in current state appraisal proceedings: 
the stock market exception, the methods of valuation, and the procedures and 
costs.”). 
 29 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833, 862 (2004).  
 30 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 1739 (2002); Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, 
Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 
767, 791 (2017). 
 31  BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 233; ROBERT D. COOTER, THE 
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 187 (2000). 
 32 Consider a hostile takeover for example.  A bilateral veto regime requires 
the approval of both the board of directors and shareholders.  Thus, when a hostile 
acquirer obtains a majority voting rights, it still cannot approve a merger 
transaction without the support of the board of directors.  Such a bilateral veto 
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of the board of directors should be viewed together with the simple 
majority rule in Delaware and any proposal to change the current 
rule needs to consider both external and decision-making costs. 
Another fundamental question in the academic literature of 
corporate law is to what extent law is important in corporate 
governance.  If a corporation is merely a “nexus of contracts,” why 
are shareholders unable to decide all the terms in a corporate 
charter?33  Current studies have not fully analyzed this question 
from a comparative law perspective. 34  This Article argues that law 
plays a larger role in corporate governance in some jurisdictions 
 
regime enhances the difficulty of a merger and may prevent a hostile acquirer from 
passing a resolution of merger that does not benefit all shareholders and increases 
the premium that target shareholders can obtain.  If a unilateral veto regime is 
adopted, a hostile acquirer may easily obtain control of a corporation and approve 
a merger transaction that may not benefit shareholders as a whole.  See John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the 
Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1175 (1984) 
(arguing that the benefit of auction contests depends on whether the ex post or ex 
ante perspective is used for analysis); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The 
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1161, 1169 (1981).  The Delaware Court usually allows the board of directors to 
adopt takeover defenses in hostile takeovers to promote shareholder welfare as 
long as the defenses meet the Unocal test. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (upholding a selective exchange offer that protects the 
substantial value of minority shareholder value).  See also Air Products and Chemicals, 
Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (2011) (affirming a board offer as adequate in price 
and not structurally coercive).  Recent studies have shown that a staggered board 
enhances shareholder welfare.  K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The 
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 80 (2016). 
 33 The contractarian view is famously proposed by Frank Easterbrook and 
Daniel Fischel.  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control 
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 698-737 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395-427 (1983). 
 34 Current studies have not provided a full account of why mandatory rules 
vary across countries.  John Coffee first argued that the balance between enabling 
and mandatory rules shifts over time and varies across jurisdictions, depending on 
the competence of the judicial system.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Mandatory/Enabling 
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 
(1989).  Moreover, as this Article will show, while John Coffee is certainly correct 
that judicial capacity will affect mandatory rules, other factors, including for 
example, the presence of institutional investors, may  also potentially affect the level 
of mandatory rules in corporate law.  After John Coffee pointed out the importance 
of a comparative perspective, few studies have explored the mandatory rules in 
various jurisdictions.  Although there are a few scholars who consider different 
options to shareholder protection from a comparative law perspective, their 
analysis is not focused on charter amendment.  See, e.g., Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. 
Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 17, 17 (2007) 
(explaining an EU Commission proposal to harmonize shareholder rights). 
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while contract plays a larger role in other jurisdictions.  Whether law 
or contract plays a dominant role depends on the relative strength 
of different institutions. 35   Where shareholders can vote with 
relatively low decision-making costs and where legislative and 
litigation costs are high, it is more efficient for shareholders to make 
their own “contract” at will.36  Where courts and legislatures are 
sophisticated, however, law can protect the interests of shareholders 
at lower costs.37  Corporations can then delegate the tasks of charter 
amendment to the state legislature and courts,38 which may reduce 
the external costs and decision-making costs associated with 
shareholder voting.  Viewing judicial intervention this way deepens 
our understanding of the role of corporate law in corporate 
governance.39 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Section 1 develops a 
constitutional economic theory of corporate charter amendment 
rules.  It argues that different charter amendment rules incur 
different levels of external and decision-making costs.  It also 
identifies the major factors that affect the magnitude of these costs 
in different jurisdictions.  Section 2 applies this theory to explaining 
the variation in charter amendment rules across jurisdictions, 
including the state of Delaware, the U.K., Germany and France, and 
providing a new account of mandatory rules and appraisal rights in 
corporate law.  Section 3 considers the policy implications of this 
theory on the design of mandatory rules in corporate law, especially 
in emerging economies, and the implications on theoretical debates 
about increasing shareholder power and the role of law in corporate 
governance.  
1. A CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY FOR CORPORATE 
CHARTER AMENDMENT 
A corporate charter is the constitution of the corporation, which 
lays out the rules governing the corporate decision-making process.  
 
 35 See infra Section 3.3. 
 36 See infra Section 3.3. 
 37 See infra Section 3.3. 
 38 Hansmann, supra note 3, at 9. 
 39  Some scholars argue that corporate law is trivial, and corporations can 
always select their desired level of corporate governance.  Black, supra note 18. 
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When shareholders invest in a corporation, they all agree to a 
corporate charter.  However, circumstances may arise that demand 
the corporate charter be amended.  The constitutional economic 
theory, developed by Buchanan, has been successful in explaining 
constitution and constitutional amendment.  The theory also helps 
analyze the social costs of different charter amendment rules in 
corporate law. 
1.1. An Economic Theory of Constitution and Constitutional 
Amendment 
A corporate charter is often referred to as the constitution of a 
corporation.40   Similar to the constitution of a state, a corporate 
charter contains rules governing different decisions of a 
corporation. 41   Buchanan and Tullock famously developed a 
constitutional economic theory about the design of constitutional 
rules. 42   They argue that in devising a constitution, individuals 
submit certain activities to be collectively decided while leaving 
others in the private realm.43  In making such decisions, members 
need to consider two costs—external costs and decision-making 
costs. 
 
 40 Corporate charters can better be termed “corporate constitutions” rather 
than “corporate contracts,” since the amendment of a contract needs consent of all 
parties to a contract, but a constitution does not need a unanimous vote to be 
amended.  As scholars have long noticed, corporate law and constitutional law 
share many similarities.  See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: 
Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 
57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377 (1988) (stating that the “parallels between economic 
and political associations are numerous enough to warrant a comparison.”). 
 41  A corporate charter may include rules governing a related-party 
transaction, the issuance of stocks, and procedures of a shareholder meeting. 
 42 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6. 
 43  BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 45.  See also STEPHEN HOLMES, 
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 173 (Univ. of 
Chicago Press 1995) (“A liberal constitutional framework is a classic solution to a 
collective action problem. People may voluntarily relinquish their ability to choose 
(in some matters) in order to accomplish their will (in other matters).  Collective 
self-binding can therefore be an instrument of collective self-rule.”).  
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External costs arise because some members may dictate a 
decision that benefits them at the expense of the dissenters.44  Since 
certain decisions are made by other members of the collective, each 
individual loses part of the control over the decision and thus 
becomes potentially subject to the tyranny of the majority.  Some of 
the members may thus make a decision benefiting themselves even 
though the decision harms all members as a whole. 
Collective decision-making also incurs decision-making costs, 
both direct and indirect. 45  Participating in the collective decision 
necessarily incurs time and expenses, which impose direct costs on 
members in a charter amendment process.46  In addition, collective 
decision-making may give rise to indirect costs because of the 
problem of strategic voting.  Members may vote based on how 
others behave rather than based on their true preferences.  
Specifically, members may strategically holdout in order to get more 
private benefits.47  Consequently, decisions that benefit the state as 
a whole may be delayed or blocked, which adversely affect the 
welfare of all members of a state. 
Suppose State A faces an invasion from State B, and suppose that 
the constitution of State A requires any declaration and action of war 
to be approved by a two-third majority vote of all citizens in that 
state.  Such a constitutional rule is likely to incur significant 
decision-making costs—not only because each individual must 
undertake the costs and time to vote, but also because the vote may 
delay necessary action.  Some citizens may even opportunistically 
holdout the decision by withholding their consent in order to extort 
personal benefits.  Due to participation costs and the holdout 
 
 44 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 45 (External costs are “costs that the 
individual expects to endure as a result of the actions of others over which he has 
no direct control.”). 
 45 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 99 (“Each individual will be led to 
try to conceal his own true preferences from the others in order to secure a greater 
share of the ‘surplus’ expected to be created from the choice being carried out.”). 
 46 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 99:  
[L]ooking backward from a decision once made, everyone in the group 
will be able to see that he would have been better off had the investment 
in ‘bargaining’ not taken place at all provided an agreement could have 
been reached in some manner without bargaining . . . .One method of 
eliminating bargaining costs is to delegate decision-making authority to a 
single individual and agree to abide by the choices that he makes for the 
whole group. 
 47 Goshen, supra note 7, at 751. 
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problem, citizens of State A may take a long time to make a decision, 
during which time State B may have gained a strategic edge.48 
The optimal design of constitutional rules would seek to 
minimize the sum of external and decision-making costs, which 
Buchanan and Tullock refer to as “interdependence costs.” 49 
According to Buchanan and Tullock, members of a state are likely to 
select different decision-making rules for different activities in 
designing a new constitution.50  The magnitude of external costs 
significantly depends on the extent of impact the decision may have 
on each individual, while the magnitude of decision-making costs 
depends on the procedure and the voting rules for the decision.51  
For most legislative activities of governments, members are likely to 
choose a majority rule.52  In considering the constitutional rules on 
more important issues such as property rights and human rights, 
however, individuals will likely require a supermajority or complete 
unanimity.  As they foresee that collective actions will impose 
significant external costs on them, the reduction in external costs far 
outweighs the increase in decision-making costs caused by these 
rules.53 
To illustrate, let us consider two decisions made by a state: to  
expropriate a piece of land and to enact a new environmental law.  
The expropriation of land affects the property rights of the 
landowner without the owner’s consent.  The external costs incurred 
by the owner are likely to be more significant compared to the 
external costs on a person who disagrees with the enactment of the 
new environmental law.  Thus, even if a majority of the state 
legislators supports the expropriation of the private land, a state 
constitution is likely to impose additional requirements on the 
decision to prevent the “tyranny of the majority.”54  Meanwhile, a 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 46. 
 50 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 73-74. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 313. 
 53 Id. at 73-74. 
 54 For example, the Fifth Amendment of the United States provides that “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. 
CONST. AMEND. V.  This taking clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Although courts in the United States have generally adopted a 
deferential standard of review of the exercise of the eminent domain power by 
legislatures, judicial review nonetheless enhances the costs of governments 
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legislative majority is likely to be sufficient for the enactment of a 
new environmental law given that such decision is likely to incur 
relatively low external costs on the dissenters. 
The above analysis of the design of constitutional rules also 
applies to the rules governing constitutional amendment.  A 
constitution contains rules that set out the conditions for making 
various decisions by a state.  The rules governing the decision to 
amend a constitution is one of these decisions and thus is usually 
included in a constitution.  From the perspective of a law and 
economic theory, the amendment of a constitution is a decision 
made by the state, which also incurs external and decision-making 
costs.  For efficiency, rules governing the constitutional amendment 
process should be designed to minimize interdependency costs.  
An important implication of the economic theory is that the 
amendment clause in a constitution should not be the only 
mechanism to amend the constitution.  For example, the 
Constitution of the United States provides an amendment procedure 
in Article V, which states that “[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds 
of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments 
to this Constitution.”55  This, however, is not the only way to amend 
the Constitution. 56   For example, the commerce clause in the 
Constitution of the United States had a very different meaning prior 
to and after the New Deal.  Bruce Ackerman has documented how 
the United States changed its constitution with and without using 
Article V.57  The theoretical framework of external and decision-
making costs further suggests that the constitution of a state should 
 
expropriating private property.  See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
(deciding in an 8-0 decision that the government may take private property under 
the 5th Amendment Takings Clause for a public purpose with just compensation); 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“one person's property 
may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying 
public purpose, even though compensation be paid”); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 63, 81 (1986) (the “courts, in setting 
the limits of eminent domain, should ensure that just compensation is paid and 
enforce the due process ‘tax’—the legislative and constitutional requirements that 
push the administrative costs of eminent domain above the costs of market 
exchange in thick market settings.”). 
 55 U.S. Const. art. V. 
 56  BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 28, 29 
(1998) (suggesting that the People can undertake decisions if they wish to revise 
their Constitution: “Normal Americans have a right to assert their constitutional 
will in politics without making this project their life’s work.”). 
 57 See generally id.  
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be amended by a variety of approaches in order to reduce the social 
costs involved in constitutional amendments.  As Ackerman 
observes, a formalistic understanding of Article V would create two 
dangers—“false positives” and “false negatives”: a constitutional 
amendment may not occur even when the People have spoken; or, 
a constitutional amendment may take place even when the People 
do not intend so.58  For certain important provisions that involve the 
fundamental human rights and property interests of individuals, 
even a supermajority rule should not be able to amend them.59  For 
trivial issues, however, going through the constitutional 
amendment process may sometimes be too burdensome, which 
hurts the adaptability of the constitution.60  When only trivial issues 
are involved, a more convenient way to amend a constitution might 
be for courts to change the interpretation of the constitution. 
An example is the constitutional amendment rule itself.  Scholars 
have long recognized the importance of constitutional amendment 
rules.  Akhil Amar argues that amendment rules “are of 
unsurpassed importance, for these rules define the conditions under 
which all other constitutional norms may be legally displaced.”61 
The power of amendment is sometimes regarded as an “incident of 
sovereignty” since it is equivalent to the power of making a new 
constitution. 62   Ulrich Preuss also recognizes that the amending 
power “is necessary to preserve the flexibility and sustainability of 
the constitutional order, but it can destroy it by amending the 
constitution in an anti-constitutional tenor.”63  As a result, some 
scholars argue that the constitutional amendment rule should not be 
subject to the same constitutional amendment procedure as other 
rules contained in a constitution.64 
 
 58 Id. at 29.  
 59 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 73. 
 60 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64. 
 61 Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 461 (1994). 
 62 Suber, Amendment, in The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia 31, 32 
(Christopher Berry Gray ed., 2013). 
 63  Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German 
Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 430 (2011). 
 64 Frank I. Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1297, 1303-1304, 
n. 27 (1995) (“[P]erhaps the idea of a constitution requires absolute entrenchment 
of an amendment rule, which in turn at least relatively entrenches everything 
else.”). 
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1.2. Applying the Constitutional Economic Theory to Analyze 
Corporate Charter Amendment 
While Buchanan and Tullock mainly address issues of 
constitutional law, they recognize that “the conclusions are 
generally applicable to a wide variety of collective institutions.”65 
This Article makes the first attempt to apply this theory to study 
corporations.66  One of the major functions of a corporation is to 
aggregate the wealth of many people so that they can conduct 
businesses that each individual shareholder cannot.  Thus, investors 
must give up some control once they invest in a corporation.  
Meanwhile, shareholders will not completely forgo their control 
since corporate managers or controlling shareholders may abuse 
their power to benefit themselves rather than using the corporate 
resources to maximize shareholder welfare. 
In fact, the theoretical framework developed by Buchanan and 
Tullock can better explain corporate law since the framework is 
based on a model in which an individual is “assumed to be 
motivated by a desire to further his own interest, to maximize his 
expected utility.”67  This assumption works well when it comes to 
decisions of shareholders.  Although shareholders may be 
concerned with other values, most of them intend to further their 
own interests by obtaining investment returns.68 
One may raise an important objection to the analogy between 
constitutional law and corporate law: when shareholders join a 
corporation, they actually consent, at least implicitly, to the 
 
 65 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 119. 
 66  BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64.  The similarities between a 
corporate constitution and a state constitution have long been recognized.  See, e.g., 
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter 
Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473-522 (2003); ROBERT A. G. MONKS 
& NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 140 (2008) (“Shareholders were seen as 
voters, boards of directors as elected representatives, proxy solicitations as election 
campaigns, corporate charters and bylaws as constitutions and amendments.”). 
 67 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 119. 
 68  While corporations also have other constituencies, such as employees, 
consumers, and creditors, they usually do not have a say in the corporate charters.  
Reinier Kraakman & Henry Hansmann, The End of History for Corporate Law, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 49-78 (2017).  When we discuss constitutional law, 
however, a citizen may have other values. 
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corporate charter.69  In contrast, actual consent is usually difficult to 
obtain in the context of the constitution of a state—one may be borne 
in a state without having a chance to consent to its constitution.  
However, in the context of corporate charter amendments, 
unanimous consent by all shareholders of a public corporation is 
also not possible in most circumstances.70  Thus, the amendment of 
corporate charter faces the same problem as the problem of lacking 
actual unanimous consent in constitutional law.  Courts and 
legislatures can no longer rely on the actual unanimous consent of 
shareholders due to the problem of holdout, but must “calculate” 
the consent of shareholders based on theoretical reasoning.71  Since 
actual voting is tainted with opportunism and oppression, 
legislatures and courts must consider what the choice of 
shareholders would have been had they been put behind a “veil of 
ignorance” without knowing whether they are the controlling 
shareholder or the dissenting ones.72  The framework developed by 
Buchanan and Tullock is thus important in analyzing the charter 
amendment rules. 
Another objection to this analogy may be that while democracy 
assigns one vote to each citizen, shareholders holding a larger share 
in a corporation are assigned more voting rights than shareholders 
holding a smaller stake.  This Article contends, however, that the 
constitutional economic theory developed by Buchanan and Tullock 
still applies to corporate voting.  Shareholders with a larger stake in 
a corporation have a stronger incentive to participate in corporate 
governance since they can reap more benefits from good 
performance of the corporation.73   Thus, their consent can better 
represent the interests of all shareholders compared to shareholders 
who only hold a tiny bit of shares.  I will further illustrate this point 
in Section 2. 
 
 69  Of course, there are still limited circumstances in which an individual 
inherits the shares without actually agreeing to the charter of the corporation.  In 
these cases, one can still more easily sell the shares than one can leave a state. 
 70  Most jurisdictions allow a corporation to amend the charter without 
unanimous vote.  See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/H5RH-B5JA]; Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 283 (Eng.), 
[https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J]. 
 71 Hansmann, supra note 3, at 2. 
 72 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 78. 
 73  Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class 
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 135 (1987). 
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1.3. Economic Analysis of Different Corporate Charter Amendment 
Rules within a Jurisdiction 
Different rules governing the amendment of corporate charters 
also incur a different level of external costs and decision-making 
costs.  The tradeoff between external and decision-making costs 
reflects the inevitable tradeoff between two needs—commitment and 
adaptability.74  If corporation can easily make an amendment to its 
charter, external costs would be high because some shareholders 
may amend the charter when it does not benefit all shareholders.  
From an ex ante perspective, corporations may find it more difficult 
to raise equity funding since corporate insiders or controlling 
shareholders cannot make a credible commitment not to amend the 
rules in the midstream.  If, however, the amendment to a charter is 
too difficult, decision-making costs are high.  This prevents the 
charter from adapting to new circumstances when it benefits all 
shareholders, although it preserves the original commitment made 
by all shareholders. 
Scholars have long identified an “opportunistic amendment 
problem” when a corporation amends its charter. 75   Corporate 
insiders have strong incentives to enhance their power by amending 
corporate charters at the expense of outside shareholders whose 
capital is “locked in.” 76   Even if such amendments have been 
approved by shareholders, the approval may be tainted with 
coercion or conflicts of interests.77  For example, a corporation can 
devise a “draconian” takeover defense that renders hostile takeovers 
realistically impossible.  This would harm the interests of the 
shareholders while enabling management to entrench themselves.78  
If the threshold for charter amendment is set too low, the problem 
 
 74  Ronald Gilson has made a similar distinction.  See Ronald J. Gilson, 
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 327, 342 (1996). 
 75 Gordon, supra note 9, at 1573. 
 76 The major conflict in a charter amendment is between corporate insiders 
(managers and the controlling shareholder) and outside shareholders.  See Rock et 
al., supra note 12, at 190. 
 77 Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1474.  
 78  Delaware prohibits such defenses.  See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American 
General Corp. 651 A.2d 1384 (Del. 1995) (reversing the lower court’s ruling because 
a company’s hostile takeover should have been reviewed using enhanced scrutiny 
of its “draconian” actions); Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 956. 
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of opportunistic amendment may give rise to high external costs.79  
A high threshold can alleviate the danger that a part of the 
shareholders can amend the corporate charter to benefit themselves 
at the expense of all shareholders.80 
Meanwhile, a corporation may exist for a long time. 81  
Circumstances may change, resulting in the need to adjust the 
charter to reflect these changes. 82   A high threshold for charter 
amendment incurs high decision-making costs, including the direct 
costs of shareholders participating in the voting process and indirect 
costs of shareholders failing to approve an amendment beneficial to 
the corporation because of the problem of holdout.83  Suppose that a 
corporation requires any amendment to its charter to be approved 
by unanimous vote of share.  Each shareholder thus has a veto 
power for the amendment of a corporate charter.  Each has an 
incentive to withhold its consent unless she receives some more 
personal benefits.  If all shareholders adopt this strategy, the 
amendment would fail even when the amendment would benefit 
shareholders as a whole.84 
Different charter amendment requirements, including a majority 
vote of share, a supermajority vote of share, a vote by disinterested 
shareholders, a unanimous vote, or mandatory rules, achieve a 
different balance between these two goals and are associated with a 
different level of external costs and decision-making costs. 
 
1. Different shareholder voting rules—To illustrate the different 
external and decision-making costs associated with different charter 
amendment rules, let us first consider a supermajority rule.  A 
supermajority rule sets up a barrier to shareholders or insiders 
hoping to opportunistically amend the corporate charter to enhance 
 
 79 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Hansmann, supra note 3, at 1. 
 82 Gilson, supra note 74, at 332. 
 83 Goshen, supra note 7, at 751; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 98 
(“Decision-making costs arise here because normally a bargaining range will exist, 
and, recognizing this, each individual will seek to secure the maximum gains 
possible for himself while keeping the net gains to his partners in the agreement to 
the minimum.”). 
 84 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 30, at 791. 
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their power or strengthen their positions. 85   The difficulty of 
approving an amendment to the corporate charter depends on the 
threshold.86  The higher the threshold for approval, the lower the 
external costs become.87  If shareholders holding 99% of the shares 
of a corporation all agree to a merger transaction, the danger that 
such a transaction would cause harm to the rest of the shareholders 
becomes much smaller than in a case where only shareholders with 
51% of the voting shares agree.  The problem with raising the voting 
requirement, however, is the increase in decision-making costs—
shareholders may also attempt to obtain more benefits by “holding 
up” the approval of amendment, even when such an amendment is 
beneficial for all shareholders.  Thus, if the threshold for approving 
a proposal is set too high, many beneficial amendments may be 
thwarted. 
It is also possible for shareholders to delegate the power to 
amend the corporate charter to shareholders holding less than 50% 
of shares.  For example, a corporation may delegate the power to the 
board of directors88 to amend its corporate charter.  In that case, the 
controlling shareholder would have the ultimate say on the 
amendment.  Moreover, in some jurisdictions, shareholders can 
choose to adopt a dual-class share structure—a class of shareholders 
can possess the control rights of the corporation while the other class 
of shareholders can only obtain financial interests.89  Shareholders 
who purchase these non-voting shares essentially delegate the 
decision-making rights to those holding voting shares.  These rules 
would incur higher external costs because the board or the 
shareholders may not always act in the best interests of all 
shareholders.90  But it would probably incur relatively low decision-
making costs.91 
 
 85 A majority or minority vote or a vote by disinterested shareholders can also 
raise the barrier for shareholder voting. 
 86 A disinterested shareholder approval may also increase the difficulty of 
approving an amendment. 
 87 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64.  
 88 Whose members are mainly nominated and appointed by the controlling 
shareholder. 
 89 Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 
125 YALE L.J. 560, 563 (2015). 
 90 Id. at 566. 
 91 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64. 
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For any given charter provision, as the size of the vote required 
to amend it increases, decision-making costs rise but external costs 
decline.92  Decision-making costs are likely to rise at an increasing 
rate.93  This is because as the size of the required vote increases, the 
market becomes “thinner,” and the bargaining power of the 
remaining shareholders becomes stronger, leading to a more severe 
holdout problem.  When shareholders adopt an unanimity rule, 
every single shareholder can thwart the decision, in which case the 
decision-making costs would be enormous.94  
 
 92 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 64. 
 93 Id. at 68-69. 
 94 Id. at 60, 69. 
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Figure 1: Decision-Making Costs and the Size of the Vote Required 
for Charter Amendment 
 
 
Meanwhile, external costs are likely to decline as the size of the 
vote required increases because if there are more shareholders 
approving the decision, it becomes more likely that the decision 
benefits all shareholders since they all have similar interests.  When 
the decision requires a unanimous vote, the external costs become 
zero since each individual has the final say on whether the 
amendment should take place. 95   Efficient rules for charter 
amendment should thus minimize interdependency costs, i.e. the 
aggregate of decision-making costs and external costs. 96   Many 
corporations use a supermajority vote to amend their corporate 
charters because it achieves a balance between decision-making 
costs and external costs.97 
 
 95 Id. at 68. 
 96 Id. at 62. 
 97 This is similar to the analysis of decision-making rules in the design of a 
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The above analysis suggests that a corporation should use 
different rules for the amendment of different provisions.  For 
amendments that affect important interests of shareholders, 
shareholders are likely to choose a higher threshold.  For trivial 
amendments, however, shareholders are likely to delegate the 
decision to the board of directors or use a simple majority vote.  
Consider, for example, the charter amendment rules in Delaware.98  
In Delaware, the amendment of a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation requires a majority vote while the authority to amend 
the bylaws, which contain provisions that are relatively less 
important, can be delegated to the board of directors.99  Consider a 
trivial provision that stipulates the number of days that 
shareholders must be notified prior to a meeting.  This provision 
does not affect the interests of shareholders significantly.  If there is 
a sudden need for the corporation to change the period of 
notification, the decision-making costs of amending this provision 
would be too high if a majority vote is required.  It may be more 
efficient to delegate the amendment decision to the board of 
directors.  Although by delegating the decision to the board, 
shareholders risk incurring higher external costs—the board may 
not always act in the best interests of shareholders, the costs of doing 
so would be relatively low compared to, say, a decision to issue new 
stocks.  Such a delegation is not likely to significantly raise external 
costs since the matter is trivial and the potential dissenting 
shareholders are not likely to suffer much loss.  Thus, requiring the 
corporation to use a single amendment rule for amending these 
trivial provisions would be too costly.  Meanwhile, there might be 
provisions that are so fundamental to shareholders that even a 
supermajority vote cannot duly protect minority shareholders, in 
which case a unanimous rule may be more appropriate. 
 
2. Mandatory Rules—Apart from the shareholder voting rules 
discussed above, mandatory rules can also be viewed as charter 
amendment rules.  By treating some rules in corporate law as 
mandatory, legislators prevent corporations from amending them 
with a majority vote or a supermajority vote of shares.  Mandatory 
rules therefore incur much higher decision-making costs compared 
to a majority or a supermajority rule because mandatory rules 
 
 98 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1). 
 99 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a). 
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prevent the charter from adapting to new circumstances.  However, 
to the extent that legislatures seek to promote shareholder welfare 
and to curb the opportunistic amendment problem, mandatory rules 
lower external costs.  When legislatures make certain rules 
mandatory, they may still be amended later when legislators amend 
the corporate statutes.  Mandatory rules may incur lower decision-
making costs compared to the rule of unanimity, which renders 
certain provisions almost impossible to amend when stocks are 
dispersedly held by public investors. 
 
3. Fiduciary Duty and the Duty of Fairness—Courts may also 
impose mandatory rules on corporations by judicial review, on the 
grounds of fiduciary duty and the duty of fairness.100  Fiduciary 
duty allows courts to interfere in the amendment of corporate 
charters ex post without specifying which rules are mandatory.101  
For example, the Delaware court has developed a set of case laws 
starting with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. that impose 
heightened standards of review on corporate decisions to adopt 
takeover defenses. 102   When an amendment does not involve a 
takeover defense, courts may still intervene on the ground of the 
duty of fairness.103  Courts enjoy a certain advantage over legislators 
because they do not need to lay out bright line rules about what 
amendments are prohibited in advance and can intervene when 
they detect opportunism in the amendment decisions. 
The social costs that arise from judicial review can also be 
analyzed using the framework of decision-making costs and 
external costs.  By delegating the tasks of curbing opportunistic 
amendments to courts, shareholders may no longer need to require 
a supermajority vote to approve the amendment of a corporate 
charter, which significantly reduces the decision-making costs 
 
 100 See Branson, supra note 40, n. 3.  See also Douglas M. Branson, Countertrends 
in Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law 
Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 70-
72 (1983) (listing the effects of fiduciary duties on a corporation). 
 101 Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 956; Unitrin, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1361. 
 102 Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 956; Unitrin, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1361. 
 103 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1588; E. R. Latty, Fairness. The Focal Point in 
Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REV. 2 (1942) (emphasizing fairness as 
the focal point in any discussion over the legality of “arrange elimination”); 
Kamena et al. v. Janssen Dairy Corporation, 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A.2d 200, 217(1943) 
(weighing whether a corporation’s proposed business plan “shocks the conscience” 
of the court). 
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because it alleviates the problem of holdout.  A court can decide to 
permit an amendment and rule against the attempts by certain 
opportunistic shareholders to block the decision.  When 
shareholders are too dispersed to assert their rights efficiently, 
courts may consider their interests and reject the amendments that 
are harmful to shareholders.104  However, judicial review may also 
incur a certain level of decision-making costs—parties to a dispute 
need to go through the litigation procedure, incurring 
administrative and litigation costs.105  Moreover, the external costs 
of this strategy depend on whether courts can successfully detect 
opportunistic conduct. 
 
4. Combination of Strategies—It should be noted that the above 
analysis has not considered the possible combinations of different 
strategies.  A common combination of charter amendment rules is 
to require the board of directors to initiate an amendment to a 
corporate charter before shareholders can vote on the decision, 
which creates a “bilateral veto”—an amendment that needs both the 
approval of the board of directors and a majority vote of 
shareholders.106  This arrangement essentially imposes additional 
restrictions on charter amendment compared to a rule that only 
requires shareholder approval.  It may increase the decision-making 
costs compared to a simple majority rule of shares—even when 
shareholders largely believe that an amendment is desirable, they 
cannot initiate it without the support of the board.  Meanwhile, it 
may reduce external costs since it becomes more difficult for some 
shareholders to amend the charter. 107   However, compared to a 
supermajority rule, a “bilateral veto” may incur relatively lower 
decision-making costs since the number of directors is usually small, 
and they can act rather quickly with relatively low costs of decision 
making.  But, delegating the power to the board rather than using a 
supermajority rule may incur the danger that some corporate 
insiders control the board and make decisions for their private 
benefits, incurring higher external costs compared to a 
supermajority rule. 
 
 104 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 30. 
 105 See e.g. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 
7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61 (1991) (discussing the costs involved in shareholder 
litigation). 
 106  See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 186. 
 107 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 233; COOTER, supra note 31, at 187. 
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1.4. Economic Analysis of Charter Amendment Rules Across 
Jurisdictions 
As illustrated above, different charter amendment rules are 
likely to incur different level of external costs and decision-making 
costs.  The magnitudes of external costs and decision-making costs 
are likely affected by a set of factors that vary across jurisdictions.  
In some jurisdictions, curbing external costs is a more important 
goal for policymakers and public shareholders.108  In others, external 
costs may be low, and decision-making costs become the major 
concern. 109   Identifying these factors may further enable us to 
explain charter amendment rules across jurisdictions. 
 
1. Decision-Making Costs of Shareholder Voting—Let us first 
consider the decision-making costs incurred in shareholder voting.  
Decision-making costs include the direct costs that shareholders 
must bear in participating in the collective decision and the costs 
arising from the problem of holdout.  Both of these costs are likely 
to be affected by the ownership structure of corporations and the 
presence or absence of institutional investors. 
To illustrate, let us consider two hypothetical corporations.  In 
corporation A, a controlling shareholder holds about 21% of the 
stocks, while a few institutional investors hold only 7% of the stocks, 
and the rest are held by individuals who do not participate in 
corporate governance.  In corporation B, the institutional investors 
hold blocks of shares and have certain incentives to participate in 
corporate decision-making.  The decision-making costs of a high 
threshold for charter amendment, say, a three-fourths supermajority 
vote of shareholders, is likely to be higher for corporation A than 
corporation B.  Suppose that corporation A needs to amend its 
corporate charter to grant the board more authority in related party 
transactions, assuming these transactions are beneficial for the 
corporation.  Given the free-rider problem, corporation A’s 
shareholders do not have sufficient incentive to participate in 
corporate governance.  In the shareholder meeting about the 
amendment decision, only the controlling shareholder and the 
institutional investors, holding in total 28% of the stocks of the 
 
 108 See infra Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of various jurisdictions. 
 109 See infra Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of various jurisdictions. 
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corporation, are present.  The institutional investors who hold 7% of 
the stocks thus have de facto veto power over the amendment 
decision.  They can act opportunistically by threatening to block the 
amendment unless the controlling shareholder agrees to give them 
personal benefits.  Since they only hold a small proportion of shares, 
their incentive to approve the amendment is relatively small since 
they obtain only 7% of the benefits, while they may gain much more 
by holding up the decision.  As a result, they may refuse to approve 
a charter amendment even when the amendment is beneficial for all 
shareholders.110  In corporation B, by contrast, institutional investors 
may possess stronger incentives in studying or approving the 
amendment.  Suppose institutional investors present in a 
shareholder meeting hold up to 80% of the stocks of the corporation.  
Assume that only institutional investors would participate in the 
shareholder meeting.  Any institutional investors hoping to hold out 
the amendment decision would need to own at least 20% of the 
shares (a quarter of 80% of the stocks).  If the amendment is not 
approved, the institutional investor is likely to suffer losses as well.  
The presence of active institutional investors significantly reduces 
decision-making costs because it alleviates both the direct costs and 
the problem of holdout. 
 
2. Decision-Making Costs of Mandatory Rules and Judicial Review—
The decision-making costs of mandatory rules also vary across 
jurisdictions. 111   Mandatory rules are only unamendable to the 
extent that legislators have not passed an amendment to the 
corporate law in a particular state.  If a state frequently amends its 
mandatory rules, the decision-making costs may not be very high.  
Moreover, in some states, corporations can choose between different 
types of organizations, including for example, partnership, business 
trust, limited liability company, and a general business corporation.  
In these states, mandatory rules do not necessarily limit the 
 
 110 The institutional investor may overestimate the benefits for the controlling 
shareholder and demand significant benefits from the controlling shareholder, 
which the controlling shareholder may not be willing to provide.  Consequently, 
the amendment may not take place.  See generally Goshen, supra note 7. 
 111 In some jurisdictions, the decision-making costs of amending the corporate 
law are relatively high because corporate law is not considered as a priority in the 
political agenda.  See BRYAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND 
OPERATION (1997) 233. 
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autonomy of parties.112  An entrepreneur hoping to raise money by 
issuing equity can thus signal her intention to credibly commit to a 
set of rules that cannot be changed.113  Additionally, in a state with 
a federal system, corporations can also pick the state of 
incorporation, which allows them to select different sets of corporate 
constitutions.  Each state has its own corporate law that contains a 
distinct level of mandatory rules.  Entrepreneurs who hope to signal 
that they want to commit to a set of rules that cannot be changed 
afterwards can thus register in a state with tight mandatory rules.  
By contrast, in other states where there is only one set of corporate 
law, the decision-making costs of mandatory rules may be very 
high. 
Another important factor that affects the magnitude of decision-
making costs of mandatory rules by legislators is legislative costs.  
To amend a corporate statute, legislators would need to go through 
complex deliberation procedures, incurring significant 
administrative costs.  Spending resources on amending a corporate 
statute also means that less attention would be devoted to other 
pressing issues.  A crude proxy for measuring the legislative costs of 
amending a corporate statute is the frequency of the amendment of 
the statute.  In the U.K., for example, scholars argue that company 
law is usually not given a high priority since it is apolitical.114  As a 
result, company law is not frequently amended. 115   In China, a 
developing country, the Company Act was first enacted in 1993 and 
has only been amended twice so far, in 2005 and 2014, while the 
landscape of corporations in China has been changing drastically.  
The delay in amending the corporate law may negatively affect the 
adaptability of corporate charters if many provisions are mandatory. 
The decision-making costs of judicial review depend on the 
efficiency of the legal system.  In some states, resorting to litigation 
 
 112  Romano, supra note 18, at 1600 (“Moreover, if a state has a particular 
payout restriction, such as a capital surplus requirement, which prevents a firm 
from paying out a dividend, it can reincorporate in a state that does not have the 
same rule”). 
 113 Armour et al., What is Corporate Law, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 22 (2nd 
ed., 2009). 
 114  See BRYAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND 
OPERATION (1997) 233 (explaining the U.K. Parliament’s limited ability to pass 
legislation and how that causes it to deprioritize matters that are not of immediate 
concern). 
 115 Id. 
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may be exceptionally costly for shareholders.  Moreover, in states 
where class action is not allowed, each shareholder would tend to 
“free ride” on the efforts of others and would not initiate lawsuits 
against corporations even when the amendment of corporate 
charters harms their interests. 
 
3. External Costs of Shareholder Voting—The magnitude of 
external costs incurred in shareholder voting also depends on 
several factors and varies across jurisdictions.  Perhaps one of the 
most important factors is the ownership structure of the corporation.  
In a corporation, shareholders holding more shares are entitled to 
more voting rights, while each citizen in a state has only one vote.  
This is an important concern in considering the relationship between 
external costs and decision-making costs.  If a corporation is held by 
a controlling shareholder who holds more than 50% of shares, a 
simple majority vote is likely to incur high external costs, compared 
to a corporation in which shares are dispersedly held.  Majority 
shareholders can always amend the corporate charter in any way to 
further their own interests.  Under such circumstances, a 
supermajority vote, or a majority of the minority vote, may 
significantly reduce external costs.  Similarly, in a corporation with 
a controlling shareholder holding 90% of the shares, a three-fourths 
supermajority vote may not be able to significantly reduce external 
costs since it does not prevent opportunistic amendments initiated 
by the controlling shareholder. 
The magnitude of external costs also depends on the 
idiosyncratic value each shareholder subjectively attaches to the 
rights conferred by a certain provision.116  If shareholders all have 
similar goals, the consent of some members can serve as evidence 
that the rest of the shareholders would also agree if they were not 
trying to hold out the decision to obtain more personal benefits.  
Allowing the majority’s consent to also bind the minority would 
impose lower external costs, as Figure 2 shows. 
  
 
 116 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 115 (“It seems reasonable to expect 
that more will be invested in bargaining in a group composed of members who 
have distinctly different external characteristics than in a group composed of 
roughly homogeneous members.”). 
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Figure 2: External Costs and Size of the Vote Required (Low 
Idiosyncratic Value) 
 
By contrast, if the amendment of certain provisions affects 
shareholders’ interests in different ways, a majority or a 
supermajority vote becomes questionable.  Figure 3 presents the 
curve of external costs, which remain largely steady as the size of 
the vote required to amend the charter increases and only drops 
steeply down to zero when a unanimity rule is reached.  For 
example, in a merger transaction, some shareholders may have 
“inframarginal” value—they believe that the shares they own are 
worth more than the market price.  Thus, shareholders may disagree 
as to whether the consideration in a merger transaction is adequate.  
Allowing shareholders with a majority of the voting shares to make 
the decision on behalf of all shareholders would mean that the 
shareholders who believe the stocks to be most valuable are coerced 
into selling their stocks.  One may argue that the inframarginal value 
always exists because if shareholders did not believe the value of the 
stocks to be above the market price, they would have sold them 
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supermajority rule with a high threshold may not significantly 
reduce external costs unless it reaches close to unanimity. 
The factor of idiosyncratic value explains why corporate law 
generally imposes more constraints on classified shares and 
shareholders with different rights.  In many jurisdictions, the 
amendment of corporate charters that affect the interests of one 
particular class of shares needs the approval of shareholders of that 
class.117  Meanwhile, the creation of unequal shareholder rights is 
sometimes prohibited by the “one share, one vote” principle in some 
jurisdictions.118  Even in jurisdictions where it is allowed, corporate 
law may require a higher threshold of shareholder voting.119  When 
shareholders are treated differently, their interests may significantly 
diverge.  A majority or a supermajority vote by all shareholders may 
not adequately protect the interests of the dissenting shareholders. 
  
 
 117 See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 633 (U.K.) (providing that when an 
amendment varies the rights attached to a class of shares, a group of at least 15% of 
the holders of that class “may apply to the court to have the variation cancelled”); 
Aktiengesetz[AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL I at 1089, last 
amended by Art. 5 Amendment Act, May 10, 2016, BGBL I at 1142 (Ger.), 
[https://perma.cc/6X2K-C9JF] [hereinafter Stock Corporation Act (Ger.)] (“[A] 
resolution of the shareholders’ meeting shall require a majority of not less than 
three fourths of the share capital represented at the passing of the resolution.”); 
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 322 (providing that acts that 
are likely to adversely affect the class shareholders of any class of shares “shall not 
become effective unless a resolution is made at a Class Meeting constituted by the 
Class Shareholders of the shares of such class”). 
 118 See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One 
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 688 (1985) 
(discussing the NYSE’s longstanding “one common share, one vote rule” and its 
history in the United States). 
 119 For example, under Article 109(2) of the 2005 Companies Act of Japan, a 
non-public company can stipulate in its charter that shareholders be treated 
differently.  Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 109(2).  However, 
pursuant to Article 309(4), 
resolutions of the shareholders meetings which effect any amendment in 
the articles of incorporation . . . with respect to the amendment in the 
articles of incorporation pursuant to the provisions of Article 109(2) shall 
be made by the majority . . . of all shareholders, being a majority equating 
three quarters (in cases where a higher proportion is provided for in the 
articles of incorporation, such proportion) or more of the votes of all 
shareholders. 
Id. at 309(4). 
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4. External Costs of Mandatory Rules and Judicial Review—The 
magnitude of external costs incurred in using mandatory rules to 
curb the opportunistic amendment problem is affected by the 
political economy of the legislative process of corporate law in 
different states.  For example, a statutory amendment may benefit 
managers rather than shareholders since dispersed shareholders 
suffer from the free-rider problem while managers can organize 
themselves to push for certain amendments to corporate statutes in 
the state. 120  Under these circumstances, delegating the task to state 
legislators to devise mandatory rules may still incur relatively high 
external costs.  Similarly, although courts, securities regulators, and 
stock exchanges usually incur relatively low external costs because 
they are a relatively disinterested party, it is also possible that judges 
and regulators may be captured by corporate insiders who are 
economically and politically powerful, which may translate into 
high external costs.121 
 
 120 Black, supra note 18, at 568. 
 121  See, e.g., G. William Schwert, Public Regulation of National Securities 
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The external costs incurred by delegating the decision to courts 
in the form of judicial review depend on the expertise of the court.  
In developed countries, courts are generally more sophisticated in 
making decisions on corporate law issues, but often the legal 
institutions are less developed in developing countries.  
Shareholders may also delegate the amendment decision to 
securities regulators and stock exchanges, which may help curb the 
opportunistic amendment of corporate charters.122  Regulation by 
stock exchanges may impose certain pressure on listed corporations, 
deterring them from acting opportunistically against the interests of 
public shareholders. 123   Stock exchanges usually can react much 
faster than legislators and courts to respond to new problems.  In 
developing countries where the judicial system is underdeveloped, 
stock exchanges may possess more expertise and thus play a larger 
role than courts and legislators. 
2. EXPLAINING CHARTER AMENDMENT RULES 
The above theoretical framework can be employed to explain 
several puzzles in the corporate law literature, including the 
variation of charter amendment rules in corporate law across 
jurisdiction, the mandatory rules that exist in corporate law, and the 
procedural burdens that are usually associated with the exercise of 
appraisal rights. 
2.1. The Variation of Charter Amendment Rules Across Jurisdictions 
1. The United States Approach — In the United States, Delaware is 
the most important state for the study of corporate law.  The 
Delaware Corporate Code provides that the amendment of 
corporate charters must be initiated by the board of directors and 
approved by a “vote of the majority of shares present in person or 
 
 122 See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 
(1997). 
 123  See generally Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational 
Sanctions in China’s Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (2008) (examining the 
distinct paths that stock market develops by tracing China’s regulations of the stock 
market). 
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represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the 
subject matter.”124  For some decisions, such as a merger or a sale of 
assets, Delaware law requires a majority of the outstanding 
shares.125  A quorum consisting of no less than one third of the shares 
is required, although the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the 
corporation can specify a higher quorum requirement.126  Without 
the initiation of the board of directors, shareholders cannot approve 
any change to the corporate charter.127  Other significant corporate 
changes such as merger and issuance of new shares also need to be 
initiated by the board of directors.128  This “bilateral veto” regime is 
a unique characteristic of the law in Delaware, while board approval 
is not necessary in amending the charter in the U.K., Germany, and 
France.129 
The above theoretical framework can explain the Delaware 
model.  Let us first compare the Delaware bilateral veto model with 
a simple majority rule.  The bilateral veto regime requires two levels 
of approval similar to the “bicameral legislature” design in the 
United States.  This bilateral veto model incurs additional decision-
making costs when compared to a simple majority rule that requires 
only a majority vote of shares by shareholders.130  On the other hand, 
the bilateral veto regime may reduce external costs compared to a 
majority rule, since shareholders controlling above 51% of shares 
cannot initiate an amendment to the corporate charter without the 
boards’ approval.  This bilateral veto may be effective in protecting 
the minority shareholders against a hostile takeover. 
 
 124 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) (2019).  Although corporations are free to 
choose a supermajority vote, it is not mandatory.  See id. § 242(b).  In an anti-
takeover context, a supermajority vote is sometimes employed as a “shark 
repellent;” a corporation may raise the size of the vote required to approve a merger 
in its charter, which cannot be amended unless by a supermajority vote.  In this 
way, shareholders ensure that the provision is locked-in and cannot be amended 
easily by a hostile acquirer.  See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: 
Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, supra note 74, at 790 (discussing how 
“lock-up amendments” can be used to deter unwanted takeovers). 
 125 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c), 271(a), 275(b). 
 126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216. 
 127 In Europe, the charter usually can be amended without initiation by the 
board.  See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 186. 
 128 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242. 
 129 See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 186. 
 130 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 233 (discussing the institution 
of the bicameral legislature in constitutional systems). 
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However, if the bilateral veto regime is compared, instead, to a 
supermajority rule that requires a three-fourths vote of shares, the 
bilateral veto regime may incur lower decision-making costs than 
the three-fourths system since directors in the bilateral veto regime 
could usually act with lower reliance on shareholders.  That said, the 
bilateral veto regime would likely incur higher external costs than 
the supermajority rule since directors under the bilateral veto 
regime are selected only by a majority vote of shares.  Thus, in 
bilateral veto regime, shareholders holding a majority of shares 
could have greater control of the board and may still harm the 
interests of the rest of the shareholders. 
While some scholars worry about management entrenchment 
under the bilateral veto approach,131 this Article suggests that the 
bilateral veto arrangement and the simple majority rule need to be 
considered together.  The combination of these two strategies 
achieve a unique balance between decision-making costs and 
external costs.  If Delaware did not require board initiation and, 
instead, adopted a simple majority rule, such a choice may raise 
external costs since some shareholders could more easily amend the 
corporate charter in their favor at the expense of all shareholders.  
This combined approach may also reduce decision-making costs 
and allow charters to adapt to new circumstances more easily. 
The above theory can also explain the difference between charter 
amendment rules in Delaware and the supermajority rule adopted 
by many European countries.  Although the bilateral veto regime 
adopted by Delaware incurs relatively high external costs compared 
with the supermajority rule, there exist alternative mechanisms to 
protect the interest of minority shareholders, thus alleviating the 
concern for external costs.  One important mechanism is judicial 
review—courts impose a fiduciary duty on directors to ensure that 
these transactions will not harm the interests of shareholders. 132  
Courts in Delaware are renowned for their expertise in corporate 
law and actively engage in resolving corporate charter amendment 
disputes. 
An example may help illustrate the role of courts in charter 
amendment.  Consider a corporation that decides to issue senior 
securities or eliminate existing rights by a board decision approved 
 
 131 See generally Bebchuk, supra note 29.  
 132 See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 220. 
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by a majority vote cast by shareholders.133  The Delaware courts 
frequently review such decision to see whether it meets the fiduciary 
duty.  In an early case in 1936, Keller v. Wilson & Co., shareholders 
with majority voting rights in a corporation decided to cancel the 
dividends accrued on its preferred stock.134  The Delaware court 
invalidated the action on the ground that it violated the vested 
property rights of the holders of the corporation’s preferred stock.135  
Although the vested property right doctrine was later discarded,136 
the Delaware court would still intervene to protect shareholders 
against unfair or inequitable treatment.137  The Delaware law relied 
significantly on ex post legal intervention by courts rather than 
relying on ex ante legislation or shareholder voting to approve 
charter amendments.  Courts also engage in decisions that involve 
the amendment of bylaws.  In another Delaware case, Blasius 
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,138 a hostile acquirer, Blasius, proposed 
to the board of directors of Atlas to enlarge the board from eight to 
fifteen and to appoint another eight directors in order to seize 
control of Atlas.  The board thwarted this attempt by amending the 
bylaws to add two more directors to the board, preventing Blasius 
from seizing control even if the shareholder’s proposal were 
approved.139  The court ruled that directors cannot interfere with 
shareholders’ rights to vote unless there is a “compelling 
 
 133  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1).  
 134 See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936).  
 135 Id. at 125-26 (“It is one thing to confer a general power to accomplish a 
purpose in the future.  It is quite another thing to say that the power may be 
exercised to destroy a right accrued and recognized as a vested right of property.”). 
 136 See Branson, supra note 40,  n. 81; see, e.g., Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 
105 R.I. 36, 44 (1969) (“Delaware [has] discarded ‘vested rights’ as the test for 
determining the power of a corporation to eliminate a shareholder's right to 
preferred stock dividend accumulation[ . . . .]”). 
 137 See Latty, supra note 103, at 1 (arguing that fairness should be the focal 
point in discussing the legality of particular corporate decisions); Kamena et al. v. 
Janssen Dairy Corporation, 133 N.J. Eq. at 217-18: 
If such a plan is inequitable to the extent that it shocks the conscience of 
the court, this court then has the right as well as the duty to enjoin its 
consummation.  It is more a question of fair dealing between the strong 
and the weak than it is a question of percentages or proportions of the 
votes favoring the plan. 
 138 See Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.Ch. 1988). 
 139 Id. at 655.  Delaware law allows shareholders to delegate the amendment 
of the bylaws to the board of directors.  See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109. 
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justification.”140  This case demonstrates that although Delaware law 
allows corporations to delegate authority to the board to amend the 
bylaws, the court can intervene to ensure that such power is not 
abused.141   
The efficient legal system in Delaware also prevents holdout 
from happening even though corporate insiders can easily amend 
the articles of incorporation and the bylaws.142  If the courts are 
capable of detecting holdout, the threshold of shareholder voting to 
approve an amendment decision can be lowered to reduce decision-
making costs without the danger of raising external costs to a high 
level.143   These factors might explain why legislators designed a 
lenient rule in Delaware after weighing the consent of shareholders. 
The above theoretical framework of external costs and decision-
making costs also explains the seemingly “inconsistent” 
arrangement whereby shareholders are allowed to initiate changes 
to the bylaws, which contain “second-order rules,” while they 
cannot initiate changes to the charter provisions, which are the 
“first-order rules”—an arrangement Bebchuk refers to as a puzzle.144  
The theory proposed in this Article suggests that board initiation 
should be viewed as an additional barrier to the opportunistic 
amendment of corporate charter rather than a limitation on 
shareholders’ rights.  Thus, the current law is reasonable since the 
amendment to the corporate charter requires two steps—board 
approval and shareholder approval, while amendment to the 
bylaws requires the approval of only one of the corporate organs.  
To sum up, for the state of Delaware, using a bilateral veto rule 
may significantly lower decision-making costs compared to the 
 
 140 See Blasius Indus. Inc., 564 A.2d at 661. 
 141 Scholars have noted that corporate rules in Delaware are “probably the 
least regulatory of states.”  Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1482.  
 142  In Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), the 
bylaws allowed directors to move the date of the shareholder meeting.  Directors of 
the corporation moved the date of the shareholder meeting in order to make it more 
difficult for shareholders to attend and to replace directors.  The court banned such 
a move on the ground that it violated the shareholders’ franchise. 
 143 Professor John Coffee Jr., in considering the tradeoff between ex ante bright 
line prohibitions and ex post judicial review, argues that courts in the United States 
tolerate contractual freedom because of their ability to detect opportunistic actions.  
I believe, however, the tradeoff between the second-party and the third-party 
approach deserves more attention.  Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1620.  The U.K. 
courts may not be as sophisticated as the Delaware courts.  CHEFFINS, supra note 
111, at 309. 
 144 See Bebchuk, supra note 29, at 846. 
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supermajority rule.  Additionally, the bilateral veto rule may not 
increase external costs compared to a supermajority rule as initially 
considered, since alternative mechanisms such as fiduciary duty 
enforced by courts offer additional protection for shareholders.  
Therefore, the bilateral veto rule may be efficient in the state of 
Delaware compared to a supermajority rule.  While some scholars 
in the United States argue that a board-centered corporate 
governance structure incurs agency costs and have called for 
empowering shareholders, 145  a supermajority rule may incur 
significant decision-making costs significant enough to render it an 
inefficient or less efficient approach.146 
 
2. The U.K. Approach—By comparison, under the Companies Act 
of the U.K., a resolution to amend the corporate charter needs to be 
passed by a three-fourths majority. 147   If a corporation seeks a 
variation of the rights of a class of shares, the shareholders must vote 
as a separate class.  The U.K. law has also set forth a quorum 
requirement for such decisions. 148   Section 334(4) provides that 
under these circumstances, “two persons present holding at least 
one-third in nominal value of the issued shares of the class in 
question (excluding any shares of that class held as treasury shares)” 
need to be present in most meetings.149  These rules suggest that the 
U.K. law has set a higher threshold for the amendment of corporate 
charters.  Apart from the amendment of charter provisions, the U.K. 
law also sets a 75% threshold for mergers, which is higher than  
Delaware requires.  Corporations listed on the market in London 
also need to gain shareholder approval for transactions of corporate 
 
 145 See generally id. (arguing that, by allowing shareholders to adopt charter 
amendments, corporate governance would improve). 
 146 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 
30, at 1755 (expressing skepticism toward Bebchuk’s argument that increasing 
shareholder power will improve corporate governance). 
 147  U.K. companies can pass a written resolution by a majority of not less than 
75% of the total voting rights of eligible members.  They can also pass a resolution 
on a show of hands by not less than 75% of the persons who actually vote at the 
meeting.  They can also pass a resolution on a poll taken at a meeting “by members 
representing not less than 75% of the total voting rights of the members who (being 
entitled to do so) vote in person, by proxy, or in advance on the resolution.”  
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, supra note 1, § 283 (Eng.).  
 148 Id. § 630(4). 
 149 Id. § 334(4). 
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assets reaching a certain size.150  Existing shareholders also enjoy 
preemptive rights and can purchase new shares pro rata before 
shares are issued to outsiders.151  
The U.K. model can be termed a “shareholder-centered model” 
since the amendment of corporate charters significantly relies on 
shareholder approval.  Two factors may explain the U.K.’s high 
threshold for amendments to corporate charters  First, courts in the 
U.K. are less sophisticated than their counterparts in Delaware and 
lack the expertise in dealing with corporate law issues.152   As a 
result, external costs in the U.K. may be higher since courts may not 
be able to detect wrongdoing by corporate insiders or controlling 
shareholders. 
Second, institutional investors in the U.K. are active participants 
in corporate governance.153  Studies have shown that institutional 
investors in the U.K. hold a higher percentage of shares than their 
counterparts in the United States.154  This makes it easier for the 
 
 150 Financial Conduct Authority, 43 Listing Rules 10.1.3 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/3WP8-XWEU].  See also Rock et al., supra note 12, at 221. 
 151  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, supra note 1, § 560-77 (Eng.), 
[https://perma.cc/B9WD-KJ7J].  By contrast, in the United States, the default rule 
is that shareholders do not have preemptive rights.  Scholars have noted that the 
preemptive rights may delay the issuance of new shares and raise decision-making 
costs.  See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 196. 
 152 See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory 
Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 431 (2003) (“The vast majority of judges [in the 
U.K.] lack any expertise with the realities of the corporate world.”). 
 153  See Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe—
Accountability and Convergence, 61 AM. J.  COMP. L. 301, 366-67 (2013) (analyzing the 
active function of corporate boards in several European Countries); Bernard S. 
Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under 
Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2002 (1994) (explaining the role of financial 
institutions in corporate governance in the U.K.).  In recent years, however, the 
equity shares held by institutional investors in the U.K. have gradually declined, 
replaced by more foreign institutional investors.  A survey in 2008 showed that 
most publicly traded stocks in the U.K. were held by foreign investors (42%).  Brian 
R. Cheffins, The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1004, 1018 (2010) 
(highlighting that many of the foreign investors are still institutional investors). 
Domestic institutional investors held about 30%,while individuals held about 10%. 
Id.  See also BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH 
BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 390 (2008) (breaking down the change in owner ship, from 
1993 to 2006, of shares in publicly traded U.K. companies). 
 154 See, e.g., John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel Jr, Corporate 
Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United 
Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 1750 (2002) (“In the United States, institutional 
shareholders own approximately 50% of the shares of the country’s publicly quoted 
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largest institutional investors to exercise control.155  Shareholders 
thus can participate in corporate decisions with low decision-
making costs.  Consequently, it is external costs, not decision-
making costs, that are the main worry for corporate shareholders in 
the U.K., which makes a higher threshold for charter amendment 
more appropriate. 
 
3. The Middle Road: France and Germany—French law and German 
law have taken an approach somewhere in between the approaches 
of Delaware and the U.K.  Under French corporate law, an 
amendment of the articles of association needs to be approved by a 
two-thirds majority vote present or represented. 156   A merger 
transaction also requires a two-thirds majority vote.157  Shareholders 
holding or representing one quarter of the voting shares need to be 
present at an extraordinary general meeting to meet the quorum 
requirement.158  If the quorum requirement is not met, a second 
meeting could be convened where there is no quorum 
requirement.159  This enables corporations to move forward without 
the approval of a supermajority vote by all shareholders. 
While current studies have already recognized the importance 
of an active judicial system in determining the scope of mandatory 
rules in corporate law,160 judicial capacity is apparently not the sole 
factor since it cannot fully explain the differences in corporate law 
across jurisdictions.  One may compare French law with U.K. law 
and conclude that French law sets a lower threshold for charter 
amendment—a two-thirds majority vote of shares and no quorum 
 
companies, with the remainder held directly by individual investors.  In the U.K., 
in contrast, the equivalent figure is more than 70%.”). 
 155 Id. at 1751 (“In Britain, it is common for a company’s twenty-five largest 
institutional investors to own a majority of the shares.  In the U.S. the same number 
of institutions will typically only own about one-third of the equity in a 
corporation.”). 
 156  CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-96 (Fr.) 
(Translated to English), [https://perma.cc/V6P4-6CS9]. 
 157 Id. arts. L. 236-2 and L. 225-96. This is also the minimum requirement for 
public companies in Europe. Council Directive 78/855, art. 7, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 38. 
 158  CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE], supra note 156, art. 
L225-98 (An ordinary general meeting can make decisions “only if the shareholders 
present or represented hold at least one fifth of the voting shares” when it is first 
convened.). 
 159 Id. art. L. 225-96. 
 160 See generally Coffee, Jr., supra note 32, at 1293 (describing the courts’ lack of 
involvement in repurchasing rules and corporate liability). 
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requirement, whereas in the U.K., a three-fourths majority is 
necessary.  This does not suggest, however, that the French court is 
more capable of detecting opportunist actions by corporate insiders. 
This Article provides an explanation more aligned with the 
reality: the decision-making costs in France may be higher compared 
to the U.K.  In the U.K., corporations are held mainly by institutional 
investors who have a strong presence in corporate governance.161  
By contrast, corporations in France usually have concentrated 
ownership, while institutional investors traditionally play only a 
small role compared to those in the U.K. and the state of Delaware.162  
For a long time, households in France owned a significant 
proportion of shares of listed corporations.163  Thus, a three-fourths 
supermajority vote may incur relatively high decision-making costs 
in France.  Additionally, since many French companies have a 
controlling shareholder holding a majority of shares, a simple 
majority rule is likely to incur high external costs.  Examining both 
external and decision-making costs enables a clearer understanding 
of rules governing corporate charter amendments in France. 
 
 161 CHEFFINS, supra note 111, at 64 (1997); Black & Coffee, Jr., supra note 153, at 
2002 (“U.K. institutions hold about two-thirds of all publicly traded British stocks, 
while U.S. institutions only hold around half of U.S. publicly traded stock.”). 
 162 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Corporate Governance: A 
Survey of OECD Countries, at 33 (2004), 
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/21755678.
pdf. [https://perma.cc/5UYT-R9HC]; Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. 
[OECD], OECD Economic Surveys: France, at 118 (1997), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-france-1997_eco_surveys-fra-
1997-en [https://perma.cc/GLJ6-A4GJ].  See also Antoin Murphy, Corporate 
Ownership in France: The Importance of History, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL 
MANAGERS 185, 188 (2005) (listing concentration of ownership and extensive 
family ownership as two of the most salient features of France’s current corporate 
ownership structure).  Statistics show that above 24% of the largest 416 French 
firms have a controlling shareholder.  James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in 
French Corporate Governance, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 31, 42 (1998).  The average level 
of shareholder attendance is only about 30% of the corporate capital.  Yvew 
Guyon, France, in SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND PRACTICES IN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 95, 102 (Baums Theodor & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1999).  Statistics 
show that in the largest 155 French companies, only 48 of them have institutional 
investors.  Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the 
U.K., Germany, and France, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 30, 36 (1997).  Some other studies 
suggest that the proportion of shares held by individuals is lower.  Gérard 
Charreaux & Peter Wirtz, Corporate Governance in France, 1-11 (2007).  However, 
this is likely because many individuals hold equity interests by owning non-
financial corporations. 
 163 See Fanto, supra note 162, at 43. 
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Consider for example two hypothetical corporations, one in 
France and one in the U.K.  The French corporation has a controlling 
shareholder holding 30% of the shares and several institutional 
investors holding 10% of the shares in total, while the rest are held 
by individual shareholders who do not have incentives to 
participate in corporate decisions.  Setting the threshold for charter 
amendment at three-fourths majority may allow the institutional 
investors in the French corporation to effectively block the 
amendment.  However, since these shareholders hold only 10% of 
the shares of the corporation, their decision does not necessarily 
reflect the interests of all the shareholders.164  They may hold out the 
decision for their personal benefits.  Therefore, lowering the 
threshold to two-thirds may significantly reduce decision-making 
costs.  In the U.K. corporation, by contrast, institutional investors 
who have both the incentives and the expertise for participating in 
a charter amendment decision hold a majority of the stocks, while 
individual shareholders hold only about 10%.  A three-fourths 
majority is not likely to give rise to high decision-making costs since 
shareholders attending a meeting are likely to hold a high 
proportion of the shares of the corporation, making it difficult for 
any particular shareholder to hold out the decision without holding 
a significant block of shares in the corporation.165  Thus, a three-
fourths majority rule may incur high decision-making costs in 
France but not in the U.K. 
Germany takes a different, but similarly balanced approach.  
While the articles of association can be amended by a majority vote 
below the three-fourths level, amendment of important provisions, 
including, for example, the purpose of the corporation, must have a 
three-fourths vote.166  The issuance of a new class of preferred stocks 
and merger transactions also need a three-fourths majority vote.167  
When a decision of the corporation negatively affects the interests of 
a class of shares, it needs to be approved by a three-fourths majority 
 
 164 See generally Goshen, supra note 7. 
 165 See Franks & Mayer, supra note 162. 
 166 See Stock Corporation Act (Ger.), supra note 117, at 1142, § 179.  See also id. 
§§ 182(2), 186(1), 193, 202(2), 222.  For relatively trivial matters, a simple majority 
would suffice.  See, e.g., id. § 113(1); Ernest C. Steefelt & Bernhard von Falkenhausen, 
New German Stock Corporation Law, 4 CORNELL L. REV. 518, 541 (1967) (explaining 
that although most resolutions pass by a simple majority, anything above normal 
importance requires a three-fourths majority).  
 167 See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 197. 
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vote of the shareholders adversely affected. 168   Additionally, 
German law does not allow shareholders to delegate the power to 
the board of directors to approve the amendment of corporate 
charters, except in several limited circumstances, including, for 
example, “the authority to make amendments that relate solely to 
the wording of the articles.”169 
The factor of institutional investors may also explain the 
shareholder voting rules under German law.  Amending corporate 
charters in Germany is still relatively easier than in the U.K., where 
any amendment needs a three-fourths majority.  This can again be 
explained by the fact that institutional investors, such as banks, 
trusts, and insurance companies, play a smaller role in Germany 
than in the U.K.170  Institutional investors have both the expertise 
and the incentives to participate in corporate governance.  
Corporations with many institutional investors thus may incur 
lower decision-making costs in using a supermajority rule 
compared with a corporation with many retail investors.  The 
dominant corporate financial structure in Germany can also explain 
why German law did not choose a simple majority rule.  In 
Germany, most listed corporations are held by a controlling 
shareholder.171  A simple majority rule would incur high external 
costs since the majority shareholder would dominate the 
amendment of the corporate charter.172 
 
 168 See Stock Corporation Act (Ger.), supra note 117, at 1142, § 179. 
 169 Id. §§ 119, 179(1).  Shareholders may also “authorize [sic] the management 
board [  . . .] to increase the share capital up to a specified par value (authorised [sic] 
capital) by issuing new shares against contributions,” or to cancel shares by means 
of mandatory redemption.  Id. §§ 202(1), 237(6).  Moreover, shareholders can act 
without actions from the board. Rock et al., supra note 12 at 186. 
 170 Id.  See also Franks & Mayer supra note 162, at 33-37 (providing comparative 
statistics of the proportions of shares owned by different groups within France, 
Germany, and the U.K.); Thomas Kirchmaier & Jeremy Grant, Corporate Ownership 
Structure and Performance in Europe, 2 EUR. MGMT. REV. 231, 237 (2005) (comparing 
the ownership of institutional shareholders to those of other owners in France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K.).  
 171 Theodor Baums, Germany, in SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND PRACTICES 
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 113 (Theodor Baums & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 
1999); Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, Corporate Control Around the World, 
Working Paper 23010 http://www.nber.org/papers/w23010, at 49 (2016). 
 172 The above analysis also explains the difference between German law and 
French law.  Although corporations in both Germany and France have concentrated 
ownership, studies suggest that banks play a relatively larger role in Germany since 
they hold a larger proportion of shares in corporations.  Franks & Mayer, supra note 
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2.2. Mandatory Rules in Corporate Law 
The above theory can also explain mandatory rules in corporate 
law, since mandatory rules can also be viewed as charter 
amendment rules that bar shareholders from amending certain 
provisions in the corporate charters.  Mandatory rules in corporate 
law have long been an interesting subject for corporate law 
scholars.173  In the academic literature, a corporation is often referred 
to as a “nexus of contracts.” 174   The contractarian view, most 
famously supported by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, posits 
that corporate law mainly contains enabling rules as default 
contractual terms, which reduce the transaction costs between 
different parties in a corporation, including shareholders and 
managers.175  Easterbrook and Fischel argue that corporate law is 
what the parties would have agreed upon had the transaction costs 
been lower.  Since the transaction costs of enacting the corporate 
contract are often too high, corporate law provides the fiduciary 
duty enforced by courts, which allows courts to “fill the gap” in the 
corporate contract.176  If corporations are like contracts, parties to a 
corporation should thus be allowed to write their own contract to 
further their interest.  It thus remains an interesting question what 
justifies mandatory rules in corporate law. 
Jeffrey Gordon has famously proposed an opportunistic 
amendment hypothesis, which is the dominant theory that explains 
mandatory rules.177  Corporations may opportunistically amend the 
charter after shareholders invest in the corporation.178  The decision 
 
162, at 32-35.  This is consistent with the fact that German law has provided a higher 
threshold for charter amendment compared to French law. 
 173 See Gordon, supra note 9; Romano, supra note 18; Black, supra note 18; 
Bebchuk, supra note 18;  Eisenberg, supra note 18. 
 174  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of The Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 
(1976) (describing organizations as legal fictions that “serve as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships”). 
 175 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 33, at 
737; Easterbrook &  Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 33, at 427. 
 176 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 33, at 427. 
 177 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1591.  Romano, supra note 18 Black, supra note 
18. 
 178 One example is the charter amendment rules themselves.  While charter 
amendment rules in corporate laws across the globe usually provide that 
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to amend the corporate charter may not reflect the true consent of 
shareholders.179  Such midstream changes would allow corporate 
insiders to enhance their power and even to entrench themselves.180  
Thus, even scholars who fully embrace the contractarian view 
should be suspicious when a corporation amends its charter because 
true consent is difficult to obtain given the holdout problem.181 
Scholars have pointed out that the opportunistic amendment 
hypothesis has serious drawbacks.  For example, Romano argues 
that corporations are allowed to adopt takeover defenses which may 
harm the interests of shareholders and benefit corporate insiders.182  
The opportunistic amendment hypothesis does not fully explain this 
 
shareholders can amend the corporate charters with a supermajority or a majority 
vote of shares, these charter amendment rules themselves are not subject to the 
same rule.  For example, in the state of Delaware, the mandatory charter 
amendment rules include the following: (1) while shareholders are generally free 
to delegate the power to amend the bylaws to the board of directors, they cannot 
delegate the power to amend the certificate of incorporation to the board; (2) 
shareholders must vote on certain mergers.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 242, 
251(c).  Corporate laws in other states of the United States are similar to the state of 
Delaware in granting strong power to the board of directors.  Bebchuk, supra note 
29, at  844.  These rules can be termed “non-delegation” rules in corporate law, 
similar to the non-delegation doctrine in administrative law.  Moreover, listed 
corporations in the United States also cannot amend their charters to establish a 
dual class share structure, which allow some shareholders to decide the 
amendment of the corporate charter.  Voting Rights Listing Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. 
26,376 (July 12, 1988).  See also Rock et al., supra note 12, at 192.  These rules bar 
shareholders from delegating the amending power to the board of directors or a 
class of shareholders who are usually insiders of the corporation.  Similarly, the 
2006 Companies Act in the U.K. mandates that any amendment to the articles of 
association needs a supermajority vote of shares, thus preventing shareholders 
from delegating the power of amending the articles to shareholders holding only a 
majority of shares.  Additionally, German law also does not allow shareholders to 
delegate the power to the board of directors to approve the amendment of corporate 
charters, except in several limited circumstances, for example in making 
“amendments that relate solely to the wording of the articles.” Stock Corporation 
Act (Ger.), supra note 117, §§ 119, 179(1).  Shareholders may also “authorise [sic] the 
management board [ . . .] to increase the share capital up to a specified par value 
(authorised [sic] capital) by issuing new shares against contributions,” or to cancel 
shares by means of mandatory redemption.  Id. §§ 202(1), 237(6). 
 179 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 665 (Del. 1952) (noting 
where a board of directors of the defendant corporation adopted a restricted stock 
plan to come from authorized but not yet issued and reacquired shares.  Plaintiff 
challenged because of her pre-emptive rights which was dismissed by the chancery 
court.  The Supreme Court of Delaware re-manded for trial). Branson, supra note 
40, at 392.  Rock et al., supra note 12, at 24. 
 180 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1573. 
 181 See Bebchuk, supra note 25, at 1820-1860. 
 182 See Romano, supra note 18, at 1606. 
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phenomenon.  Moreover, the opportunistic amendment problem 
could, in theory, be addressed by raising the threshold for 
amendment to a supermajority rule or a unanimity rule.183  If, as 
scholars argue, that opportunistic amendment is the only problem, 
shareholders can simply agree to certain “entrenched provisions” in 
the initial charter that certain rules can never be amended, thus 
barring all midstream changes from occurring. 184   In fact, the 
Companies Act of the U.K. provides a special type of provision in 
the articles of association called “entrenched provisions.”185  These 
provisions may be made either upon formation of the corporation 
or “by an amendment of the company’s articles agreed to by all the 
members of the company,” (i.e. by unanimous consent of all 
shareholders).  Specifically, shareholders can agree in the initial 
corporate charter that the charter amendment rule cannot be 
amended in the midstream without unanimous consent of 
shareholders. 
The opportunistic amendment hypothesis cannot explain why 
mandatory rules are still necessary under these circumstances.  One 
explanation is that mandatory rules may incur lower decision-
making costs compared to entrenched provisions because there is 
still some chance that mandatory rules would be amended later by 
statute or modified by a court through an altered interpretation of 
such rules.  The decision-making costs of mandatory rules may still 
be higher than most rules of supermajority vote, depending on how 
frequently the state amends its corporate statutes. 
The constitutional economic theory offered in this Article can 
better explain the mandatory nature of charter amendment rules by 
suggesting that shareholders should choose different charter 
amendment rules for different issues to balance external costs and 
decision-making costs.  For provisions in a corporate charter 
concerning the fundamental interests of shareholders, state 
legislatures may treat these provisions as mandatory because 
 
 183  Klaus J. Hopt, Directors’ Duties and Shareholders’ Rights in the European 
Union: Mandatory and/or Default Rules? 9, 13-32 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. [ECGI] 
1, Law Working Paper No. 312/2016, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2749237 
[https://perma.cc/5HCL-F3WF]. 
 184 Under the 2006 Companies Act of the U.K., shareholders can agree to a set 
of “entrenched provisions” which cannot be amended unless by unanimous 
consent.  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, supra note 1, § 22 (Eng.). 
 185 Id. 
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reducing external costs is more important.186  Mandatory rules incur 
lower external costs compared to a majority vote or a supermajority 
vote by shareholders, since corporate insiders cannot 
opportunistically amend the charter.  They are thus similar to a 
unanimous vote by shareholders from an external-cost standpoint. 
The above analysis also explains why mandatory rules in 
corporate law vary over time and across jurisdictions, which has not 
been satisfactorily explained by existing theories.  Eisenberg argues 
that certain constitutive rules, including structural rules, 
distributive rules, and fiduciary rules, should be mandatory. 187  
Structural rules “govern the allocation of decisionmaking power 
among various corporate organs and agents and the conditions for 
the exercise of decisionmaking power,” while distributive rules refer 
to rules that “govern the distribution of assets (including earnings) 
to shareholders.”188  These rules are important to prevent managers 
from entrenching themselves at the expense of shareholders. 189  
Similarly, Gordon distinguishes four types of mandatory rules: 
procedural, power allocating, economic transformative, and 
fiduciary standards setting. 190   However, these mandatory rules 
have all been qualified to some extent.191  One important reason for 
that qualification is that strict mandatory rules prevent corporations 
from adopting innovative provisions necessary to cope with 
emerging circumstances.  Relaxing some of the constitutive rights 
and structural rules may reduce decision-making costs.  
Additionally, many alternative mechanisms, including shareholder 
voting and market reputation, may help curb the opportunistic 
amendment problem.  The development of these institutional 
 
 186 It should be pointed out that current discussions in the academic literature 
often use the term mandatory rules to refer to ex ante rules prescribed by legislatures 
but not ex post decisions made by courts.  Gordon, supra note 9, at 1553 n.16.  Both 
of them are referred to as mandatory rules in corporate law in this Article.  They 
are both interventions by a third party (state) in corporate charter amendments. 
 187 See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 1462. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Eisenberg refers to this type of divergence of interests between managers 
and shareholders as “positional conflicts.”  Id. at 1480. 
 190 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1591. 
 191  As Roberta Romano points out, many other amendments to corporate 
charters that are not mandatory may also affect shareholders’ interests.  Romano, 
supra note 18, at 1606.  Although Eisenberg has considered the rationale behind the 
choice between these approaches, he has not systematically explored the factors 
behind the costs of various approaches to charter amendment.  See, e.g. Eisenberg, 
supra note 18, at 1471. 
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constraints may allow legislators to replace mandatory rules with 
more flexible rules without the risk of increasing external costs. 
Where courts are capable of detecting wrongdoing and curbing 
opportunistic amendment ex post, ex ante mandatory rules can be 
lifted to some extent.  For example, courts in many states in the 
United States once prohibited corporations from amending their 
corporate charters and issuing a senior class of securities because 
doing so violated the “vested property interests” of shareholders.192  
The issuance of a new class of securities apparently affects the 
interests of the existing shareholders and changes the “distributive 
rules” of a corporation.  Courts thus repeatedly enjoined against 
such changes based on the “vested rights” theory.193  However, the 
courts’ stance had gradually shifted in the early 20th century and 
eventually permitted the issuance of new securities.194 
Another example is the rule of fiduciary duty under corporate 
law.  While it is regarded as a constitutive rule, Delaware allows 
corporations to exempt directors from liability for breach of their 
duty of care.195  The theoretical framework of external and decision-
making costs together explains why not all constitutive rules are 
mandatory in all jurisdictions and why ex ante mandatory rules may 
change over time.196 
Lele and Siems compiled a “shareholder protection index,” and 
attempted to compare the strength of shareholder protection across 
countries by aggregating the scores for each country.197  They found 
that the law of the United States does not offer very strong 
protection for shareholders compared to many European 
countries.198  This Article postulates that the index compiled by Lele 
and Siems overlooks the possibility that in countries where judicial 
review and alternative mechanisms offer strong constraints on 
corporate conduct and protection for outside shareholders, relaxing 
ex ante mandatory rules may reduce decision-making costs.  Thus, 
having relatively light regulations on corporate internal governance 
mechanisms in the corporate law does not suggest that the corporate 
 
 192 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1640. 
 193 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1641. 
 194 Id. 
 195 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)7; Romano, supra note 18, at 1601. 
 196  For a discussion of the historical development of the vested property 
interest doctrine, see Branson, supra note 40; Latty, supra note 103, at 1-51. 
 197 See Lele & Siems, supra note 34, at 43. 
 198 Id. 
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law is weak in protecting shareholders in a specific state.  In fact, 
most of these variables Lele and Siems choose are about the rules 
governing internal governance mechanisms, including for example, 
rules governing shareholder meeting, composition of the board, 
agenda setting power, shareholders’ rights to information, and 
mandatory rules in corporate law.199  They have not considered the 
important role played by courts and the stock exchanges in 
regulating corporate decisions. 
It should be noted that the above discussion of mandatory rules 
only considers the shareholder-manager relationship, rather than 
the broader panoply of relationships between shareholders and 
other stakeholders such as creditors, consumers and laborers.  
Corporate law contains provisions that protect the interests of 
creditors, which are made mandatory to prevent shareholders from 
amending them to obtain more benefits at the expense of creditors.  
An example would be the unique structure of the board of directors 
in Germany, which offers strong protection to laborers. 200   The 
analysis for relationships of that nature would be different since 
such relationships are about the conflicts of interests between 
shareholders and other stakeholders that shareholder voting cannot 
resolve. 
2.3. The Appraisal Remedy 
Apart from mandatory rules, the appraisal remedy also governs 
the amendment of some charter provisions.  In the United States, 
every state grants the appraisal remedy to minority shareholders in 
the case of a merger that also triggers an amendment to a corporate 
charter.  Some states grant appraisal rights when a corporation 
amends its charter. 201   Many scholars have launched criticisms 
against appraisal rights, questioning whether those rights can 
protect minority shareholders.  One of the most important criticisms 
 
 199 Id. 
 200  See Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority 
Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 101 
(Oxford University Press 2nd ed. 2009). 
 201  See Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 24 at 239.  In Delaware, corporations 
may provide in their charter that an amendment to the corporate charter would 
trigger the appraisal rights.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c). 
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of the appraisal remedy is that courts often impose strict procedural 
constraints on dissenting shareholders who seek the appraisal 
remedy.202  In addition, appraisal rights can be “a frightful nuisance, 
drain, and burden” on listed corporations.203  Corporations cannot 
know in advance how many shareholders would dissent and, hence, 
cannot easily calculate the amount of cash they need to prepare in 
advance.  These problems may prevent efficient merger transactions 
from occurring.204  In subsequent studies, scholars have generally 
agreed with Manning’s critique on the inability of appraisal rights 
to protect minority shareholders.205 
 
 202  See Manning, supra note 24, at 227, 230-33.  Apart from the procedural 
costs, scholars have provided many other criticisms.  Some scholars argue that 
shareholders would not vote against a value-decreasing amendment because of the 
rational ignorance problem.  Bebchuk, supra note 25 at 1854 (“[I]t is far from clear 
that a substantial fraction of the shareholders will file for appraisal. Because of the 
rational ignorance problem, the fraction of shareholders voting against a value-
decreasing amendment might often be quite small or even nonexistent.”).  Another 
problem is that the costs of appraisal are borne by other shareholders, whose 
interests do not concern managers.  Bebchuk, supra note 25, at 1854 (“The cost of 
their use of their rights, however, will not be borne by the managers but rather by 
the other shareholders.”); Black, supra note 18, at 583.  Perhaps the earliest and the 
most famous critique was offered by Bayless Manning in 1962.  Manning questions 
the underlying rationales of the triggering conditions for appraisal right.  It has 
been unclear, Manning argues, that shareholders should be able to “jump clear of 
the corporate enterprise if they do not like its course.”  Apparently, many events 
may threaten the interests of shareholders in a corporation, including for example, 
the corporation filing involuntary dissolution, change in business scope, a massive 
dividend distribution, “Mass resignation by the management,” “introduction of a 
new product by a competitor,” and even “a Presidential heart attack.”  However, 
many states only allow shareholders the appraisal rights in a corporate merger, 
while some grants the appraisal remedy when a corporation amends its charter.  
Manning, supra note 24, at 237-239, 241-244.  For earlier discussion, see Brown, supra 
note 25, at 845; Note, supra note 25, at 340-343. 
 203 See Manning, supra note 24, at 234. 
 204 Id. at 235. 
 205 See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 70 (1976) (arguing that the exercise of appraisal rights is “highly technical, 
drawn-out, and expensive”); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Dissenter’s Appraisal 
Remedy, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1229, 1253-54 (1976) (analyzing the vices of appraisal 
procedures in California’s new corporation law); Mahoney & Weinstein, supra note 
24, at 243-45 (providing empirical analysis on how appraisals may reduce 
shareholder gains on average in transactions involving “self-interested managers”); 
George S. Geis, Internal Poison Pills, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1169 (2009) (discussing the 
idea of an “internal poison pill” as an alternative mechanism to govern the tension 
between minority and majority shareholders); Thompson, supra note 24, at 11-12 
(discussing the new transactional settings for appraisal processes, and how they 
require amendments to the appraisal provisions). 
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Constitutional economic theory offers justification for the 
procedural costs imposed on shareholders and on corporations.  The 
appraisal remedy should be made costly both for the corporation and 
for shareholders. 206   On the one hand, it is intended to curb 
opportunistic actions by the majority shareholders or insiders and, 
thus, would inevitably impose costs on the corporations.207  On the 
other hand, the design of appraisal rights should also generate 
significant costs for minority shareholders.  If minority shareholders 
are offered an appraisal remedy that is not costly at all, they would 
be incentivized to exercise that right opportunistically, which would 
increase the decision-making costs of a merger or a corporate charter 
amendment.208 
For example, one of the crucial questions in an appraisal regime 
is how the fair value of the stock should be calculated.  Should a 
court simply award the shareholder the market price of their stock?  
Or should shareholders be entitled to certain “inframarginal value” 
or, in a merger situation, a proportion of the premium generated by 
 
 206 See Vorenberg, supra note 27, at 1216-17 (“[B]alancing the relative dangers 
of oppression by the majority and harassment by the minority and what weight is 
accorded the importance of giving considerable leeway for change and growth.”); 
Note, supra note 25, at 340:  
Financial burdens incident to appraisal proceedings, however, can thwart 
the compensatory adjustment intended by the statutes. Unless a 
shareholder can shift these burdens, appraisal may be a barren right. On 
the other hand, if his threat of costly proceedings can extort exorbitant 
settlement, appraisal rights so abused may block or heavily tax desirable 
corporate change. 
 207 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 8 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 875, 901-02 (1983). 
 208 See Norman D. Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal 
Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233-234 (1931):  
The problem of the dissenting stockholder and his remedies under 
modern appraisal statutes has been one of conflict between strong and 
divergent interests. On the one hand is the need of flexibility, ease, and 
dispatch when change in structure or financial reorganization through one 
of several means is necessary . . .Contrariwise stands the interest of the 
minority who have honest convictions in the matter.  
See Henry W. Ballantine & Graham Lee Jr. Sterling, Upsetting Mergers and 
Consolidations: Alternative Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders in California, 27 CALIF. 
L. REV. 644, 651 (1939) (discussing “the desirability of making appraisal of the shares 
exclusive of irresponsible attacks to set aside a consolidation or merger is at least a 
fairly debatable measure [ . . .]” and how it is necessary to device “forms of 
remedies which will not unduly hamper and threaten the transaction of legitimate 
business.”). 
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the offer in the merger? 209   Simply awarding shareholders the 
market price would be meaningless; shareholders could simply sell 
their shares without resorting to litigation.  However, giving 
shareholders a premium would encourage them to 
opportunistically hold up the decision to amend the corporate 
charter in order to obtain that premium. 
Viewed from the perspective of external and decision-making 
costs, the strict procedural constraints on the exercise of appraisal 
rights and the uncertainty in the calculation of the fair value of 
stocks can achieve a balance between external and decision-making 
costs.210  In fact, the appraisal remedy is almost always entangled 
with the question of misconduct by controlling shareholders and 
determined by courts on a case-by-case basis.  When courts detect 
wrongful conduct committed by a majority shareholder, they tend 
to provide a favorable appraisal remedy to minority shareholders.211 
 
 209 See Wertheimer, supra note 26, at 680, fn. 339 (arguing that “wrongdoing or 
breach of fiduciary duty significantly impacts the outcome of appraisal 
proceedings.”); Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1137; In re Radiology Assocs., 611 A.2d 
at 485 (Plaintiff stockholder brought a claim against defendants challenging the 
fairness of his shares’ price set forth by the corporation, when the shares were 
eliminated because of a merger.  The court was faced with the issue of how to 
determine the fair price of the shares when granting the appraisal remedy; the 
Court held that in the particular case the preferred valuation method was the 
discounted cash flow analysis, taking into account that the other available methods 
did not adequately reflect the shares’ market value).  Neal, 1990 WL 109243, at *1. 
(Plaintiffs, minority stockholders of Alabama By-Products Corporation, made a 
claim seeking appraisal of their shares as the result of a merger based on which 
Alabama By-Products Corporation was absorbed into the Drummond Company, 
Inc.  The minority shareholders of Alabama By-Products Corporation were cashed 
out. As dissenting minority shareholders, petitioners considered the price of their 
shares inadequate, and filed a claim for unfair dealing, along with an appraisal 
action.).  See also Koh, supra note 26, at 433-34. (describing three possible sub-
concepts of fair value: pro-rata going concern value, but-for value, and fair synergy 
distribution value).  
 210 Similar arguments have been made before but have not drawn sufficient 
attention.  See Irving J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and 
Payment, 15 CORNELL L. Q. 420, 442-443 (1929-1930) (“[A]rbitrarily to tax such costs 
against the corporation might encourage objecting stockholders to use the remedy 
for blackmailing the corporation with unreasonable demands.  To levy them against 
the stockholders would have a similar opposite effect.”). 
 211 See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 26, at 433.  Wertheimer, supra note 26, at 
680, fn. 339 (arguing that “wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary duty significantly 
impacts the outcome of appraisal proceedings.”); Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 
1137; In re Radiology Assocs., 611 A.2d at 485; Neal, 1990 WL 109243, at *1.  See 
generally Koh, supra note 26.  
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The above analysis casts doubt on the proposal that the current 
procedural requirements for appraisal rights should be modified to 
make the remedy less onerous for minority shareholders. 212  
Relaxing the procedural requirements and burdens on minority 
shareholders may render it too easy for shareholders to claim 
appraisal and would, thus, significantly raise the decision-making 
costs for corporations.213 
The constitutional economic theory also explains why the 
appraisal remedy has been, so far, mainly a unique feature of the 
law in the United States, while in the U.K., France and Germany, 
dissenting shareholders are offered a way out only in exceptional 
circumstances. 214   One of the dominant factors in considering 
whether to grant appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders is the 
capacity of the court.215  The appraisal remedy will be more effective 
if courts can accurately detect wrongdoings by controlling 
shareholders and determine the fair value of stocks accurately 
without significant systemic errors.216  Whether it is a desirable rule 
in a specific state also depends on how effective a supermajority vote 
would be.  The presence of the appraisal remedy in the United States 
again suggests that the legal system in the United States is more 
sophisticated than others.  For example, France offers minority 
shareholders a way out if the controlling shareholders hold more 
 
 212 See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 26, at 708 (“A third area where appraisal 
statutes could be improved is with respect to the procedures incident to the remedy. 
In many statutes, the procedural requirements imposed on a dissenting shareholder 
remain excessively onerous.”). 
 213  The development of the appraisal rights in Canada provides a good 
illustration of this point.  When Canada first introduced the regime of the appraisal 
remedy, courts were generally sympathetic with dissenting shareholders and set 
the fair price above the market price.  This attitude changed later, however, since 
courts realize it was important to balance the interests of dissenting shareholders 
and those of the corporation.  Brian R. Cheffins & J. Dine, Shareholder Remedies: 
Lessons from Canada, 13 COMPANY LAWYER 89, 92 (1992). 
 214 In Belgium and France, the statutes do not provide appraisal rights for 
dissenting shareholders in listed corporations.  See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference 
in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of 
Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 727 (2005); Decree No. 88-603 of May 7, 1988, J.O., 
May 8, 1988, p. 6606, arts. 5-5-1 to 5-5-6 (Fr.). 
 215 Many scholars question the ability of courts to measure the value of the 
charter amendment accurately.  See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 25, at 1855. 
 216  See Wertheimer, supra note 26, at 678 (“In cases where the dissenting 
shareholders achieve a favorable result, there almost invariably is evidence that the 
acquiring party acted inequitably or engaged in overreaching.”). 
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than 95% of the shares in the corporation.217  However, under French 
law, a market regulator, the Financial Markets Authority, not the 
courts, is in charge of the enforcement of the appraisal remedy.218  
The additional challenge posed by this difference is that the 
appraisal remedy may be difficult to enforce for a jurisdiction where 
courts are not accustomed to dealing with the evaluations of a 
corporation. 
3. IMPLICATIONS 
The above framework of external and decision-making costs has 
important theoretical implications on two lines of academic 
discussions:  the debate of whether to empower shareholders in the 
United States and the role of law and contract in corporate 
governance.  This Section will address these implications. 
3.1. Choosing Mandatory Rules in Corporate Law 
The above analysis provides a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the social costs and benefits of making certain rules in 
corporate law mandatory, which may benefit developing countries 
where policymakers have yet to determine whether to employ 
mandatory rules in corporate law to regulate charter amendment.  
The analysis suggests that in evaluating the costs of mandatory 
rules, we must also consider mandatory rules enacted by alternative 
institutions such as stock exchanges.  Stock exchanges play a 
significant role in enacting mandatory rules that apply to 
corporations listed at a certain exchange.  For example, in the United 
States, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) has long prohibited 
deviation from the “one-share-one-vote” principle, although some 
stock exchanges proposed to change this rule in recent years.219  In 
 
 217 See CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH MESNOOH, LAW AND BUSINESS IN FRANCE: A GUIDE 
TO FRENCH COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LAW 139 (1994). 
 218 See Rock et al., supra note 12, at 191. 
 219  See Annie Massa, Will Wall Street Buy Into the Slow Stocks Movement?, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-13/will-wall-street-buy-
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many other states, this principle is stipulated in corporate law.  
Corporate law in Germany generally follows the “one-share-one-
vote” principle and prohibits any deviation from this principle, 
including for example, time-phased voting arrangements and 
voting caps. 220   This Article suggests that there is an important 
difference between stipulating the “one-share-one-vote” principle in 
the listing rules of stock exchanges and stipulating that principle in 
national statutes or regulations.  Using listing rules of stock 
exchanges to regulate the opportunistic amendment problem can 
significantly reduce decision-making costs since such regulations 
can be amended relatively quickly to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  If the “one-share-one-vote” principle is made 
mandatory in corporate law, the decision-making costs would be 
much higher since amending the corporate statutes incurs much 
higher legislative costs. 
The social costs of mandatory rules in a state also depend on its 
legal system.  In a state with a federal legal system, the decision-
making costs of making “one-share-one-vote” mandatory in some 
states are relatively lower since a corporation can pick the state 
where it wants to incorporate in.  States generally amend their 
corporate statutes frequently.  In a unitary system, by contrast, 
preventing corporations from adopting schemes that grant more 
voting rights to some shareholders may significantly affect the 
ability of the corporations to adapt to new circumstances and thus, 
force the corporation to incur higher decision-making costs. 
3.2. The Debate over Increasing Shareholder Power in the United 
States 
The bilateral veto arrangement in the United States has long 
been a focus of debate.  Some scholars argue that corporate law 
should increase shareholders’ power and allow them to initiate 
charter amendment.221  For example, Lucian Bebchuk has provided 
 
into-the-slow-stocks-movement [https://perma.cc/6SKY-5VBQ]；John McCrank, 




 220 See Enriques et al., supra note 200, at 59. 
 221 See generally Bebchuk, supra note 29. 
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a comprehensive discussion of the benefits of increasing the power 
of shareholders in the United States.  He argues that corporate 
charters need to adapt to new circumstances, while the veto power 
of the board will prevent efficient adaptation and create a “pro-
management distortion.”222  Others point out that granting power to 
the board of directors benefits shareholders.223 
This Article sheds new light on the debate over whether 
shareholders should be allowed to initiate amendment of corporate 
charters.  Current discussions have focused largely on the 
shareholder-manager conflicts rather than the conflicts of interests 
among shareholders. 224   Increasing shareholder power to initiate 
proposals to amend corporate charters may lead to a rise in external 
costs since charter amendment would become easier.  The 
amendment of a corporate charter initiated by some shareholders 
may not benefit shareholders as a whole, since different 
shareholders may have idiosyncratic interests.225  For example, in a 
takeover context, a corporation may have certain defensive tactics 
such as a staggered board that can enhance the bargaining power of 
the original shareholders of the corporation and allow them to 
obtain more benefits from the takeover transaction.226  If corporate 
law in the United States increases shareholders’ power and allows 
them to initiate changes to the corporate charter, some shareholders 
may acquire a significant proportion of shares and seek to amend 
the takeover defenses in the corporate charter, which may benefit 
the hostile acquirer at the expense of other shareholders.227  The 
requirement that any amendment to the corporate charter needs to 
be initiated by the board of directors establishes an additional 
barrier for the amendment of corporate charters and thus reduces 
the external costs. 
To be sure, the exact level of external costs that may arise if 
shareholders can initiate charter amendment is difficult to measure.  
It is nonetheless important to note that any proposal to change the 
bilateral veto regime needs to consider the balance between external 
 
 222 Id. 
 223 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 30. 
 224 See Goshen, supra note 30, at 791. 
 225 See Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 1745 n.54. 
 226 See Coffee, Jr.,  supra note 32, at 1175; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role 
of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 32, at 1169. 
 227  Recent studies show that a staggered board promotes the value of a 
corporation.  See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 32, at 80. 
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and decision-making costs.  If corporate laws in the United States 
are to allow shareholders to initiate charter amendment and also 
seek to maintain the same level of external costs, these laws must 
consider raising the threshold for charter amendment from a simple 
majority vote of shares to a supermajority votes.  Doing so, however, 
may increase decision-making costs. 
3.3. The Essential Role of Corporate Law 
Another relevant question in the corporate law literature is 
whether corporate governance is essentially about law or contract.228  
The theory offered in this Article also offers a new account of why 
law is important in corporate governance.  While shareholders of a 
corporation can create “entrenched provisions” that are similar in 
function to mandatory rules—thereby resolving the opportunistic 
amendment problem—these entrenched provisions may incur high 
decision-making costs.  It is because of these high decision-making 
costs that mandatory rules become necessary.  Mandatory rules 
essentially allow corporations to “amend” the rules without going 
through the shareholder voting process and to free ride on the 
efforts of legislatures and courts.229 
It should be noted, however, that decision-making costs alone 
also cannot explain why some provisions are mandatory in 
corporate law.  If decision-making costs were the only concern, 
states should provide default rules and expect corporations to 
follow them because such rules would allow corporations to then 
free-ride on the efforts of legislatures and courts when corporations 
seek to amend these provisions.230  The problem is that corporate 
insiders or controlling shareholders may then amend the provisions 
in the charter in the midstream in ways that harm shareholders’ 
interests since those provisions are merely default rules that can be 
amended with relative ease.  Mandatory rules can only be explained 
 
 228 Whose members are mainly nominated and appointed by the controlling 
shareholder.  Hansmann, supra note 3, at 9. 
 229  Some scholars have noticed that a major function of default rules in 
corporate law is to reduce decision-making costs.  This Article suggests that 
mandatory rules in corporate law can also be explained with the same theory.  
Listokin, supra note 18, at 279-308.  See also Hansmann, supra note 3, at 9. 
 230 See Listokin, supra note 18, at 279-308. 
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by considering both decision-making costs and external costs (i.e. 
the needs for adaptation and commitment). 
By taking the perspective of comparative law, this Article also 
suggests that corporate law plays a larger role in corporate 
governance in some jurisdictions than others, depending on the 
legal institutions and ownership structures of the corporations in 
these different jurisdictions.  In jurisdictions where legislatures and 
courts are more capable of making appropriate rules and detecting 
opportunist actions, law may play a larger role in corporate 
governance.  Where shareholders can write and amend their 
corporate contracts with lower costs, however, law may be less 
important in corporate governance.  In the United States, judicial 
review plays a far greater role in governing midstream changes, 
while in many other developed countries, supermajority vote by 
shareholders are more important constraints on charter amendment. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The corporate charter is the constitution of a corporation.  How 
should it be amended?  This Article identifies a fundamental 
tradeoff between the needs for commitment and adaptation, or, in 
economic terms, external and decision-making costs.  Different 
provisions in a corporate charter should be subject to different 
amendment rules.  This theory can explain why the charter 
amendment rules vary significantly between the state of Delaware, 
the U.K., France, and Germany.  This Article has identified several 
important factors that may affect external and decision-making 
costs, including judicial capacity, the ownership structure of 
corporations, and the frequency of and procedural constraints 
imposed on the amendment of the corporate statutes.  Different 
states may choose different charter amendment rules given their 
respective institutional constraints. 
Within a given state, different charter amendment rules should 
be chosen to govern the amendment of different rules.  Shareholders 
should delegate the power to the board to amend trivial provisions.  
For more important issues, shareholders should use a majority vote 
or a supermajority vote.  For provisions that involve the 
fundamental interests of shareholders, the state legislatures and 
courts should decide that such provisions are mandatory and cannot 
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be amended.  This theory can better explain mandatory rules in 
corporate law than other theories. 
The theory offered in this Article also explains the design of the 
appraisal remedy.  It suggests that the appraisal remedy needs to 
strike a balance between protecting the interests of dissenting 
shareholders from controlling shareholders or corporate insiders 
and preventing dissenting shareholders from holding out a decision 
that benefits shareholders as a whole.  As a result, the use of 
appraisal remedy must be strictly constrained.  This theory casts 
doubts on proposals to alleviate the procedural burden on 
dissenting shareholders in exercising their appraisal rights. 
The theoretical framework proposed in this Article generates 
three important implications.  This framework first suggests that in 
deciding whether to adopt mandatory rules in corporate law, 
policymakers should pay attention to alternative mechanisms that 
might achieve similar goals without incurring high decision-making 
costs, especially in emerging economies where the legislative and 
court systems differ significantly from those in developed 
economies. 
Second, this Article sheds new light on the debate over whether 
to increase shareholders’ power and grant them the power to initiate 
charter amendment in the United States.  The bilateral veto 
arrangement can be viewed as setting up an additional barrier for 
charter amendment to reduce external costs.  Allowing shareholders 
to initiate charter amendment reduces the decision-making costs but 
may raise external costs.  While a precise estimation of these costs is 
usually difficult, any proposal to change the charter amendment 
rules in the United States needs to consider both decision-making 
costs and external costs together. 
Finally, the theoretical framework offered in this Article deepens 
the understanding of the role of law and contract in corporate 
governance.  While current studies emphasize the function of law in 
curbing the opportunistic amendment problem, this Article suggests 
another function of law—reducing decision-making costs.  
Moreover, the role of the law may be more important in some 
jurisdictions than others, depending on the relative costs of 
shareholder voting and mandatory rules. 
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